Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
125<br />
Indeed, this directly relates to an advantage of objective list theories:<br />
many of the items that have been proposed by such theories have been<br />
translated into specific indicators such as health or social policy, or<br />
else overall assessments have been made that can be used for an entire<br />
population. <strong>The</strong> long-st<strong>and</strong>ing literature on social indicators can be<br />
situated in this tradition (Boelhouwer <strong>and</strong> Stoop 1999; Boelhouwer<br />
2002; Hagerty et al. 2001).<br />
<br />
in the capability approach<br />
So how does the capability approach fit in this st<strong>and</strong>ard taxonomy?<br />
<strong>The</strong> capability approach is often categorised as being an objective list<br />
theory, since functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities are plural <strong>and</strong> the selection<br />
of dimensions gives us a list of items which are judged to be valuable for<br />
persons. However, in my view there is not merely one wellbeing account<br />
in the capability approach, but several wellbeing accounts.<br />
So why is there not one, but several accounts of wellbeing in the<br />
capability literature? As was mentioned in the introduction to this<br />
section, the reason is that there are a variety of capability theories in the<br />
general capability literature, <strong>and</strong> those theories need different accounts<br />
of wellbeing. If a capability theory is used for a first-person perspective,<br />
for example by an adolescent contemplating what to do with her life, she<br />
may ask herself what she really wants: to study hard <strong>and</strong> work hard <strong>and</strong><br />
become a medical doctor? Or does she have a stronger desire to build a<br />
family <strong>and</strong> search for a job that makes it possible to spend enough time<br />
with her children? Does she want to devote her life to fighting for a<br />
good cause? In this personal deliberation, the account of wellbeing she<br />
then uses can be seen as a desire-fulfilment account in which the desires<br />
all refer to functionings.<br />
In the design of institutions, there is also often implicitly a desirefulfilment<br />
account, by trying to create valuable options (capabilities) for<br />
citizens, but by not forcing them into those outcomes (functionings). But<br />
policy making can’t be done by trying to enlarge a non-specific general<br />
account of freedom to realise one’s desires: what would that look like?<br />
In policy making, we often assume that what we owe to each other