Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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186 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
Of course, the critique is not only (<strong>and</strong> also not primarily) about Sen’s<br />
work, but about the capability approach in general, or about capability<br />
theories. But the work done by other scholars similarly doesn’t meet<br />
the criteria for being plausibly considered to be methodologically or<br />
ontologically individualistic. In general, we can say that the capability<br />
approach acknowledges some non-individual structures, <strong>and</strong> for the<br />
various more specific capability theories, the degree to which they move<br />
away from methodological or ontological individualism depends on the<br />
choices made in modules B <strong>and</strong> C. But whatever those choices are, there<br />
are already some features in module A that prevent capability theories<br />
from being methodologically or ontologically individualistic.<br />
<br />
pay sufficient attention to groups?<br />
<strong>The</strong> critique that the capability approach should focus more on groups<br />
is often related to the critique that the focus of the capability approach<br />
is too individualistic, but it is nevertheless a distinct critique. A clear<br />
example can be found in the work of Frances Stewart (2005), who argues<br />
that in order to underst<strong>and</strong> processes that affect the lives of people, such<br />
as violent conflict, one has to look at group capabilities — which she<br />
defines as the average of the individual capabilities of all the individuals<br />
in the selected group. <strong>The</strong> reason we need to focus on these ‘group<br />
capabilities’ is because they are a central source of group conflict. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
are thus crucial to underst<strong>and</strong> processes such as violent conflict.<br />
We will return to Stewart’s specific complaint below, but first<br />
unpack the general critique that the capability approach doesn’t pay<br />
enough attention to groups. To properly judge the critique that the<br />
capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to groups, we need<br />
to distinguish between a weaker <strong>and</strong> a stronger version of that claim.<br />
A stronger version of that claim would be that the capability approach<br />
cannot pay sufficient attention to groups — that there is something<br />
in the conceptual apparatus of the capability approach that makes it<br />
impossible for the capability approach to pay attention to groups. But<br />
that claim is obviously false, because there exists a large literature of<br />
research analysing the average capabilities of one group compared to