Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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4. Critiques <strong>and</strong> Debates<br />
205<br />
(e.g. Gaertner <strong>and</strong> Xu 2006, 2008; Gotoh <strong>and</strong> Yoshihara 2003; Gotoh,<br />
Suzumura <strong>and</strong> Yoshihara 2005; Pattanaik 2006; Pattanaik <strong>and</strong> Xu 1990;<br />
Suzumura 2016; Xu 2002). Some reasons for this move are the same as the<br />
arguments against desire-satisfaction theories or the happiness approach<br />
that we reviewed earlier in sections 3.7 <strong>and</strong> 3.8. Another argument is<br />
that relevant information is left out of the informational basis. If two social<br />
states have exactly the same utility levels, but social state A has also<br />
a set of legal <strong>and</strong> social norms that discriminate against one group of<br />
people, whereas in social state B, the principles of moral equality <strong>and</strong><br />
non-discrimination are protected, then surely, we should prefer social<br />
state B over social state A. But welfarism, because of its exclusive focus<br />
on utilities, is unable to take any type of non-utility information into<br />
account, whether it is the violation of deontic principles, information on<br />
rights, liberties <strong>and</strong> justice, or information on inefficient or unsustainable<br />
use of common resources. Many of the welfare economists who have<br />
embarked on the development of a post-welfarist welfare economics<br />
have focussed on the importance of freedom as an important part of the<br />
widening of the informational basis.<br />
Non-welfarist welfare economics requires some changes to our<br />
approach to welfare economics. As Sen (1996, 58) noted in his discussion<br />
of the contribution of the capability approach to non-welfarist welfare<br />
economics, if we move to an informational basis with multiple<br />
dimensions of different types (as in the capability approach) then this<br />
requires explicit evaluations of the different weights to be given to the<br />
contributions of the different functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities to overall<br />
(aggregate) social welfare. For Sen, the way to proceed is by public<br />
reasoning about those weights. This should probably not be seen as the<br />
only <strong>and</strong> exclusive way to determine them, since not all work in welfare<br />
economics is suited for public discussion — for example, it often entails<br />
desk-studies of inequalities or the analysis of the welfare effects of certain<br />
policy measures, <strong>and</strong> it is practically impossible to organise an exercise<br />
of public reasoning for every desk study that welfare economists make.<br />
Luckily, as the survey by Decancq <strong>and</strong> Lugo (2013) shows, there are<br />
various weighting systems possible that can give us the weights that are<br />
needed if one wants to aggregate the changes in different functionings<br />
<strong>and</strong> capabilities. For example, Erik Schokkaert (2007) has suggested that<br />
we derive the weights of the functionings from the contribution they