Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

56 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice
other agent-relative considerations, in an integrated system” (Sen 1982,
4). Luckily, the more recent publications in the secondary literature
on the capability approach increasingly acknowledge this principle
pluralism; the modules A7 and C4 of the modular view presented in
this book suggest that it is no longer possible not to acknowledge this
possibility.
The second type of value-pluralism relates to what is often called
the multidimensional nature of the capability approach. Functionings
and capabilities are not ‘values’ in the sense of ‘public values’ (justice,
efficiency, solidarity, ecological sustainability, etc.) but they are objects
of ultimate value — things that we value as ends in themselves. Given
some very minimal assumptions about human nature, it is obvious that
these dimensions are multiple: human beings value the opportunity to
be in good health, to engage in social interactions, to have meaningful
activities, to be sheltered and safe, not be subjected to excessive levels of
stress, and so forth. Of course, it is logically conceivable to say that for a
particular normative exercise, we only look at one dimension. But while
it may be consistent and logical, it nevertheless makes no sense — for at
least two reasons.
First, the very reason why the capability approach has been offered
as an alternative to other normative approaches is to add informational
riches — to show which dimensions have been left out of the other types of
analysis, and why adding them matters. It also makes many evaluations
much more nuanced, allowing them to reflect the complexities of life
as it is. For example, an African-American lawyer may be successful in
her professional life in terms of her professional achievements and the
material rewards she receives for her work, but she may also encounter
disrespect and humiliation in a society that is sexist and racist. Being
materially well-off doesn’t mean that one is living a life with all the
capabilities to which one should be entitled in a just society. Only multidimensional
metrics of evaluation can capture those ambiguities and
informational riches.
Second, without value pluralism, it would follow that the happiness
approach is a special case of the capability approach — namely a
capability theory in which only one functioning matters, namely being
happy. Again, while this is strictly speaking a consistent and logical