Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

More documents

Recommendations

Info

4. Critiques and Debates 191 choices, in contrast to sociology, gender studies and cultural studies, among other disciplines. In political philosophy, one sees a similar split between the core of Anglo-American political philosophy, in which the concept of the self that is endorsed is that of a rational, autonomous agent whose own plans take precedence over things he finds as ‘given’ in his life, versus other traditions in philosophy that pay more attention to relations and the social embedding of individuals, including unjust structures in which one finds oneself, as well as mechanisms that reproduce power differences. The consequence is that it is possible to use functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space in combination with many different normative accounts of choice, with a widely divergent critical content. Take as an example the choices made by men versus women between paid (labour market) or unpaid (care and household) work. In all societies women do much more household and care work, whereas men do much more paid work. Both kinds of work can generate a number of different functionings so that the largest capability set might perhaps be reached only by giving everyone the opportunity to combine both types of work. However, I would argue that in the world today, in which hardly any society allows people to combine market work and non-market work without having to make significant compromises when it comes to the quality of at least one of them, the labour market enables more (and more important) functionings than care work. These include psychological functionings like increased self-esteem; social functionings like having a social network; material functionings like being financially independent and securing one’s financial needs for one’s old age or in the event of divorce. 9 Many schools in political philosophy and normative welfare economics have typically seen the gender division of labour as ethically unproblematic, in the sense that this division is seen as the result of men’s and women’s voluntary choices, which reflect their preferences. However, this is an inadequate way of explaining and evaluating this division, because gender-related structures and constraints convert this choice from an individual choice under perfect information into a collective decision under socially constructed constraints with imperfect information and asymmetrical risks. Moreover, evaluating the gender 9 As is also suggested by the empirical findings of Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti (2000) who measured achieved functioning levels for Italy.
192 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice division of labour can only be done if we scrutinise the constraints on choice, and these may turn out to be very different for men and women. 10 What is crucial for the discussion here is that both positive theories of the gender division of labour (which are choices made in modules B3, B4, and B5) bear different normative implications. If a housewife is held fully responsible for the fact that she works at home then the logical consequence would be that she had the capability to work in the labour market. However, if we embrace a theory of choice that focuses on gender specific constraints, then we will not hold the housewife fully responsible for her choice but acknowledge that her capability set was smaller and did not contain the possibility for a genuine choice to work in the labour market. It seems, thus, that it is perfectly possible to apply the capability approach in combination with different accounts of gender-specific constraints on choices. By giving choice such a central position and making its place in wellbeing and social justice evaluations more explicit, the capability approach opens up a space for discussions of how certain choices are constrained by gender-related societal mechanisms and expectations. But again, the capability approach provides no guarantee for this: it depends on the choices made in modules B and C. For example, conservatives will want to integrate a conservative theory of gender relations within the capability approach, whereas for critical scholars it will be crucial to integrate a feminist account of gender relations, which includes an account of power. No doubt the two exercises will reach very different normative conclusions. In short, for scholars who defend a theory of human agency and social reality that challenges the status quo, one of the important tasks will be to negotiate which additional theories will be integrated in further specifications of the capability approach, especially the choices made in module C1. The conclusion is that the core characteristics of the capability approach (as listed in module A) do not necessarily have significant implications for the role of power in capability theories and applications, which can include widely divergent views on social realities and interpersonal relations. Indeed, the fact that the capability approach 10 The seminal work in this area is Susan Okin’s book Justice, Gender and the Family (Okin 1989). On the gendered nature of the constraints on choice, see also Nancy Folbre (1994).
Page 1 and 2:
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justi
Page 4 and 5:
Page 6 and 7:
Contents Acknowledgements 3 1. Intr
Page 8 and 9:
3. Clarifications 89 3.1 Introducti
Page 10:
4.7 What about power and political
Page 14 and 15:
Acknowledgements In 1998, when I st
Page 16 and 17:
Acknowledgements 5 the capability a
Page 18 and 19:
1. Introduction Many people who en
Page 20 and 21:
1. Introduction 9 capability approa
Page 22 and 23:
1. Introduction 11 Moreover, it bri
Page 24 and 25:
1. Introduction 13 Countries Outsi
Page 26 and 27:
1. Introduction 15 capabilities of
Page 28 and 29:
1. Introduction 17 their collaborat
Page 30 and 31:
1. Introduction 19 This book has a
Page 32 and 33:
2. Core Ideas and the Framework Th
Page 34 and 35:
2. Core Ideas and the Framework 23
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98:
Page 101 and 102:
90 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Ju
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
100 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social J
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152: 140 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social J
Page 201: 190 Wellbeing, Freedom and Social J
Page 253 and 254:
Page 255 and 256:
Page 257 and 258:
Page 259 and 260:
Page 262 and 263:
Index abortion 15, 145 advantage 25
Page 264 and 265:
Index 253 Fleurbaey, Marc 154 flour
Page 266 and 267:
Index 255 political institutions 14
Page 268:
show all

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?