Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
131<br />
the happiness approach. 14 Amartya Sen has pointed out repeatedly that<br />
people living at the very bottom of the social ladder (such as ‘exploited<br />
labourers’ or ‘oppressed housewives’) adapt to their situation <strong>and</strong> come<br />
to suffer less intensely. Another example is the effect of racism. If a<br />
society becomes gradually less tolerant towards cultural minorities <strong>and</strong><br />
increasingly accepts racist practices, then cultural minorities might get<br />
used to a racist social climate. Perhaps they will change their behaviour,<br />
in order to avoid contact with openly racist people. By changing their<br />
behaviour <strong>and</strong> mentally preparing for racist practices, it is possible<br />
that after a while the negative wellbeing effect of racism on minority<br />
groups will be partially wiped out. However, a policy that anticipates<br />
such adaptation processes is morally <strong>and</strong> politically problematic: racism<br />
should not be tolerated in society, even if it were not to have a significant<br />
impact on the subjective wellbeing of its victims. In order to judge that<br />
racism is not morally permissible <strong>and</strong> hence that policies should try<br />
to minimize racism, we don’t first need to investigate whether racism<br />
makes its victims less happy: that’s simply beside the point. Even if<br />
the victims of racism acted stoically <strong>and</strong> didn’t let racism affect their<br />
happiness levels, that wouldn’t make racism any less undesirable.<br />
Another form of mental adaptation which is relevant for the<br />
government is the adjustment response to income changes. Subjective<br />
wellbeing judgements about income have been shown to adapt<br />
asymmetrically to income changes. Income increases go together with<br />
higher aspirations for the future, with only one third of the increase<br />
being reflected by improvements of subjective wellbeing (Frey <strong>and</strong><br />
Stutzer 2002). Panel-analysis over a period of ten years shows that we<br />
adapt strongly to an increase in income, but much less so to a drop<br />
in income (Burchardt 2005). Thus, if people change positions in an<br />
income distribution which itself remains unchanged, then aggregate<br />
satisfaction of the population will decrease. <strong>The</strong> people who move up<br />
the ladder will be more satisfied for a short time, but quickly adapt to<br />
the new situation, whereas people who move downwards experience a<br />
larger drop in satisfaction — <strong>and</strong> this effect lasts longer as well. Tania<br />
Burchardt (2006) argues that due to similar phenomena of adaptation,<br />
people’s positions in the distribution of income, health <strong>and</strong> marital<br />
14 Yet the phenomenon of ‘adaptive preferences’ can also potentially create problems<br />
for some capability theories, as we will analyse in section 3.9.