Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

2. Core Ideas and the Framework
71
part data-driven but in addition depend on some normative decision.
Note that in the data-driven and hybrid approaches, the selection of
dimensions and the weights tends to be done through a process in
which the selection of dimensions and the determination of the weights
go hand in hand. One example is the proposal by Erik Schokkaert
(2007) of using happiness as the master-value by which we weigh the
various capabilities that together form the multidimensional account of
wellbeing. In this proposal, if the functionings do not contribute to one’s
happiness, they are given a zero weight and hence no longer count in
the wellbeing index. In methods such as this one, there are two rounds
of the selections of the dimensions: the first before one collects the data,
and the second when one uses econometric techniques to determine
the contribution that the various functionings make to the master-value
(here: life-satisfaction) and uses those as weights; those functionings
that will make no contribution will receive a weight of zero, which is
the same as being deleted as a dimension in the wellbeing index.
Third, for non-empirical applications, we can categorize methods
to determine weights in the same way as we could categorise methods
for the selection of dimensions. Morten Fibieger Byskov (forthcoming)
distinguishes between ad-hoc methods (such as the data-driven methods
discussed by Decancq and Lugo), procedural methods, or foundational
methods. A theoretical capability application could include answers to
all B-modules (including the selection of dimensions) yet decide that
the weighing of those dimensions should be done in a procedural way,
e.g. via a democratic decision-making process. Alternatively, one could
introduce one master-value that will determine which capabilities are
relevant, and also what weights they should be given. One example is
the empirical work done by Erik Schokkaert (2007), which was discussed
above. Another example, which is theoretical, is Rutger Claassen’s
capabilitarian theory of justice, in which the selection and weighing
of capabilities is done based on their contribution to that person’s
“navigational agency” (Claassen 2016).
Note that in the case in which one has essentially a monistic theory
in which there is a master-value, one may doubt whether this doesn’t
violate property A7 from the A-module. At first value, it seems that it
does. But proponents of a monistic theory may respond that all theories