Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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178 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
needs philosophers <strong>and</strong> basic needs development scholars <strong>and</strong> policy<br />
advisors — an interaction that is very present in the capability literature.<br />
This may explain why the basic needs approach has been seen as lacking<br />
solid conceptual foundations.<br />
Yet despite these hypotheses, which may help us underst<strong>and</strong> why<br />
the capability approach to a large extent replaced the focus on needs in<br />
the practical field <strong>and</strong> in empirical research, some genuine differences<br />
remain. <strong>The</strong> first difference requires the capability approach to adopt<br />
some basic distinctions that are fundamental to philosophical needs<br />
theory, <strong>and</strong> for which the capability approach in itself does not have<br />
the resources: the distinction between non-contingent needs on the one<br />
h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> contingent needs, desires, wants, etc. on the other h<strong>and</strong>. Noncontingent<br />
needs are cases in which “the needing being simply cannot<br />
go on unless its need is met” (<strong>Re</strong>ader <strong>and</strong> Brock 2004, 252). This relates<br />
to a more common-sense distinction between ‘needs’ <strong>and</strong> ‘wants’, that<br />
has an important relevance to our everyday ethical life <strong>and</strong> to policy<br />
making, but that has no equivalent in the capability approach. For<br />
some applications of the capability approach, such as those related to<br />
prioritising in conditions of extreme scarcity of resources (whether these<br />
resources are money, food, water, the right to emit greenhouse gasses,<br />
etc.) theories of needs can provide tools to guide our moral priorities that<br />
are lacking in the capability approach. Right now, preferences dominate<br />
in public decision making, but the concept of preferences cannot make<br />
a distinction between a preference for minimal amounts of water, food,<br />
safety, <strong>and</strong> social interaction, versus a preference for wine <strong>and</strong> a jacuzzi.<br />
<strong>The</strong> preferences-based approach, which has become very dominant in<br />
ethical theory as well as policy analysis by economists, doesn’t have the<br />
theoretical resources to make such a distinction, whereas it is central to<br />
some of our intuitions of how to prioritise our actions in cases of scarcity<br />
(e.g. J. O’Neill 2011; Robeyns <strong>2017a</strong>).<br />
<strong>The</strong> second difference follows from the first. <strong>The</strong> distinction<br />
in theories of needs between the morally required (meeting noncontingent<br />
or basic needs) <strong>and</strong> the morally laudable but not required<br />
(the other needs, wants, desires, etc.) implies that the needs approach<br />
may have a smaller scope than the capability approach. <strong>The</strong> modular<br />
view of the capability approach presented in chapter 2 makes clear that<br />
the capability approach can be used for a wide variety of capabilitarian<br />
theories <strong>and</strong> applications. <strong>The</strong> basic needs approach is more focussed