Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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124 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
‘reset’ our cultural <strong>and</strong> social norms, which would lead to less pressure,<br />
stress <strong>and</strong> fewer anxieties? Some alternative views of living, such as<br />
those advanced by deep ecology thinkers (e.g. Naess 1973, 1984), are<br />
based on the view that with a different set of desires, <strong>and</strong> a different<br />
appreciation of certain experiences <strong>and</strong> values, we would be able to<br />
live not only in an ecologically sustainable way, but also have higher<br />
levels of wellbeing. In sum, the desire-fulfilment theory is interesting<br />
<strong>and</strong> arguably plausible at the individual level, <strong>and</strong> also at the general<br />
level as a theoretical approach to wellbeing, which can make ample use<br />
of counterfactual <strong>and</strong> hypothetical thinking <strong>and</strong> conditions. But it is<br />
much trickier to think about wellbeing from a macro or third-person<br />
perspective in the world as it is, in which we don’t have information on<br />
how each person’s preferences have been formed <strong>and</strong> influenced.<br />
How does the objective list theory fare? Objective list theories<br />
are accounts of wellbeing that list items that make our lives better,<br />
independent of our own view on this. <strong>The</strong> claim of objective list theories<br />
is that there is an irreducible plurality of issues that make up wellbeing;<br />
wellbeing is plural <strong>and</strong> cannot be reduced to a single thing. Secondly,<br />
those items are objectively good for us, whether or not we attach any value<br />
to (or desire) those items. Hence items such as being healthy, or having<br />
friends, or feeling well, are all good for us, whether we personally value<br />
them or not.<br />
What are some of the main strengths <strong>and</strong> weaknesses of the objective<br />
list theories? Objective list theories are generally criticised for not<br />
respecting people’s views about their own lives, <strong>and</strong> hence taking away<br />
the authority to decide the quality of those lives from the agents leading<br />
them: in other words, for being paternalistic. Who is to decide that,<br />
say, social relationships are good for us? Now, this seems a very valid<br />
critique if we use an objective list theory for purely descriptive <strong>and</strong> firstperson<br />
truth-seeking purposes, as the vast literature in philosophy does.<br />
But if one uses accounts of wellbeing for policy or political purposes,<br />
the public nature of the dimensions of wellbeing is rather important.<br />
This relates to what political philosophers have called ‘the publicity<br />
criterion’: if wellbeing is used for purposes of institutional design or<br />
policy making, those principles used need to be capable of being known<br />
by all to be satisfied in society (Rawls 2009; Anderson 2010, 85).