Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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212 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
capability approach clearly lays out the properties that every capability<br />
theory, application or analysis should meet, <strong>and</strong> thereby provides a<br />
powerful response to the risk of the inflation of the term ‘capability<br />
theory’.<br />
Having sorted all of this out, we are free to put the capability approach<br />
to good use. It is impossible for one person to know all the interesting<br />
paths that the capability approach should take (even if that one person<br />
benefited from comments <strong>and</strong> many helpful discussions with others).<br />
But as a start, let me just mention some lines of further thinking, research<br />
<strong>and</strong> interventions that would be interesting to explore.<br />
First, within the disciplines in which the capability has been discussed<br />
<strong>and</strong> developed, there are plenty of opportunities to see what difference<br />
it can make if pushed all the way to its limits. In some fields, such as<br />
educational studies, the capability approach is well-developed <strong>and</strong><br />
widely applied. But there are others in which the capability approach<br />
has so far merely been introduced, rather than being used to develop<br />
mature <strong>and</strong> complete theories. One question, which remains unanswered<br />
after our discussion in section 4.10, is whether the capability approach<br />
can provide an equally powerful alternative to utility-based welfare<br />
economics. In the literature on theories of justice, which we discussed<br />
in section 3.13, the capability approach is widely debated, but there<br />
are hardly any fully developed capabilitarian theories of justice, apart<br />
from Nussbaum’s (2006b) <strong>and</strong> the theory of disadvantage by Wolff<br />
<strong>and</strong> De-Shalit (2007). We need book-length accounts of capabilitarian<br />
theories of justice, capabilitarian theories of institutional evaluation,<br />
capabilitarian theories of welfare economics, <strong>and</strong> so forth.<br />
Second, the capability approach is, so far, almost exclusively used<br />
for evaluative <strong>and</strong> normative purposes — such as studies evaluating<br />
whether certain people are better off than others, studies trying to<br />
propose a certain policy or institution (for the effect it has on people’s<br />
functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities) rather than others, or studies arguing<br />
for justice in terms of people’s capabilities. But one could also use<br />
the capability approach for explanatory studies, e.g. to examine which<br />
institutions or policies foster certain capabilities, or using the notions of<br />
functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities in the analysis of people’s behaviour <strong>and</strong><br />
decision making. For example, labour economists model the decision<br />
about a person’s labour supply — how many hours she would be