Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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144 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
In philosophical ethics, if we say that an issue is a moral issue, this<br />
implies that we have duties to comply with the moral norm, no matter<br />
how we feel about it. <strong>The</strong>se are very stringent <strong>and</strong> universal duties.<br />
An example is: do not kill an innocent person; or: respect the human<br />
dignity of all persons. Normative questions are much broader, <strong>and</strong> can<br />
also entail other values, such as prudential value (wellbeing). Questions<br />
about the right are questions about morality, whereas for most ethical<br />
frameworks questions about the good are questions about other areas of<br />
normativity, but not morality straight. 17<br />
<strong>The</strong> modular view that has been presented in chapter 2 has in the<br />
core module A only normative properties related to the good. Properties<br />
A1 <strong>and</strong> A2 define functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities, <strong>and</strong> property A5 claims<br />
that a person’s advantage should focus on functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities:<br />
this gives the capability approach the core of its theory of the good. <strong>The</strong><br />
complete theory of the good may be extended by additional choices<br />
made in module C4.<br />
What does the core of the capability approach (module A) have to<br />
say about the right? <strong>The</strong> only property related to the right is normative<br />
individualism. <strong>The</strong>re are no additional claims related to the right<br />
included in module A. Hence, the only conclusion we can draw is that<br />
the capability approach would claim that, if <strong>and</strong> whenever rightness<br />
involves a notion of the good, one should use the theory of the good as<br />
entailed by the core characteristics of the capability approach. Hence,<br />
if we believe that the right thing to do is to prioritise the lives of the<br />
worst-off, then a capabilitarian version of this claim would say that we<br />
should prioritise the functionings <strong>and</strong>/or capabilities of the worst-off<br />
rather than their happiness or their comm<strong>and</strong> over resources.<br />
Yet many claims concerning the right make no reference to an<br />
account of the good. <strong>The</strong> core of the capabilities approach is, thus,<br />
orthogonal to other aspects of the theory of the right, except for ethical<br />
individualism, which is only a very small part of a theory of the right.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fact that the capability approach has, at its very core, more to offer<br />
in terms of the theory of the good than in terms of the theory of the<br />
right has an important implication, namely that the capability approach is<br />
17 An influential exception are utilitarians <strong>and</strong> other consequentialists, who define the<br />
morally right as that which maximizes the (non-moral) good (Driver 2014; Sinnott-<br />
Armstrong 2015).