Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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4. Critiques <strong>and</strong> Debates<br />
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another, e.g. women <strong>and</strong> men (Kynch <strong>and</strong> Sen 1983; Nussbaum 2000;<br />
Robeyns 2003, 2006a) or the disabled versus those without disabilities<br />
(Kuklys 2005; Zaidi <strong>and</strong> Burchardt 2005). <strong>Capability</strong> theorists have<br />
also written on the importance of groups for people’s wellbeing, like<br />
Nussbaum’s discussion of women’s collectives in India. Several lists of<br />
capabilities that have been proposed in the literature include capabilities<br />
related to community membership: Nussbaum stresses affiliation as<br />
an architectonic capability, Alkire (2002) discusses relationships <strong>and</strong><br />
participation, <strong>and</strong> in earlier work I have included social relationships<br />
(Robeyns 2003). <strong>The</strong> UNDP (1995, 2004) has produced Human<br />
Development <strong>Re</strong>ports on both gender <strong>and</strong> culture, thus policy reports<br />
based on the capability approach focus on groups.<br />
<strong>The</strong> weaker claim states that the present state of the literature on the<br />
capability approach does not pay sufficient attention to groups. I agree<br />
that contemporary mainstream economics is very badly equipped to<br />
account for group membership on people’s wellbeing. But is this also<br />
the case for the capability approach? While some capability theorists<br />
have a great faith in people’s abilities to be rational <strong>and</strong> to resist social<br />
<strong>and</strong> moral pressure stemming from groups (e.g. Sen 1999b, 2009b),<br />
other writers on the capability approach pay much more attention to<br />
the influence of social norms <strong>and</strong> other group-based processes on our<br />
choices <strong>and</strong>, ultimately, on our wellbeing (e.g. Alkire 2002; Nussbaum<br />
2000; Iversen 2003; Robeyns 2003a). <strong>The</strong>re is thus no reason why the<br />
capability approach would not be able to take the normative <strong>and</strong><br />
constitutive importance of groups fully into account. Admittedly,<br />
however, this is a theoretical choice that needs to be made when making<br />
scholarly decisions in modules B3, B5 <strong>and</strong> C1, hence we may not agree<br />
with the assumptions about groups in each <strong>and</strong> every capability theory.<br />
If we return to the reasons Stewart gave for a focus on group<br />
capabilities, we notice that the main reason stated is that analysis<br />
of group capabilities is needed to underst<strong>and</strong> outcomes. Yet that is<br />
precisely what the just mentioned capability applications do (since<br />
they do not only measure group inequalities in capabilities but also try<br />
to underst<strong>and</strong> them). Those applications also investigate how group<br />
identities constrain groups to different degrees, or which privileges<br />
they ensure for certain groups. In my reading of the literature, many