Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

3. Clarifications
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a fair requirement in order to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state that
one learns the major dominant local language, then we have to make a
distinction between those who do, those who don’t but could, and those
who don’t but are unable. In practice, that distinction may sometimes
be very hard to make. Nevertheless, the general point to take home is
that an outcome-oriented theory of justice needs to be bolstered with an
account of what justice requires from the institutional design for a state
or coalition of states. Reasons of reciprocity, feasibility, and stability
may justify a focus on functionings rather than merely on capabilities.
Fourthly, there are pervasive cases of interdependence between
people’s capabilities that may prompt us to look beyond the capability of
a single person. One important type of case is that in which a capability
is available to a person but only if other people do not also want to realize
that capability (Basu 1987, 74). For example, two spouses may each have
the capability of holding demanding jobs which are each incompatible
with large caring responsibilities. However, if these spouses also have
infants or relatives with extensive care needs, then at best only one of
them may effectively realize that capability. Another type of case is that
in which the capability of one person is only possible if enough other
people have chosen to realise the corresponding functioning (Claassen
2014, 67–68). Take the example of being protected against dangerous
infectious diseases such as polio or measles by way of a vaccine. In order
genuinely to have that capability, one does not only need access to a
vaccination, but enough other people need to choose to be vaccinated,
since protection requires that a certain minimal number of people are
vaccinated. In other words, my child’s capability to be protected from
the debilitating effects of polio or the measles depends on your choice to
exercise that capability and opt for the functioning — that is, to vaccinate
your children.
Since capability sets may thus include freedoms that are conditional
(because they depend on the choices of other people), it might be better
to focus both on the individual’s capability set and also on what people
have been able to realize from their own capability sets, that is, their
functionings or wellbeing achievements. The question of who decides
or should decide this sort of question highlights the importance of
agency and procedural fairness, which are often additional normative
commitments included in the capability theory that is developed.