Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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4. Critiques <strong>and</strong> Debates<br />
199<br />
there are at least four valid reasons why we should make a distinction<br />
between the two ideas.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first reason is historical: while the capability approach has<br />
been very important in the development of the human development<br />
paradigm, the human development paradigm has derived insights<br />
<strong>and</strong> concepts from several other theories <strong>and</strong> frameworks. Human<br />
development has been defined as “an expansion of human capabilities,<br />
a widening of choices, an enhancement of freedoms <strong>and</strong> a fulfilment<br />
of human rights” (Fukuda-Parr <strong>and</strong> Kumar 2003, xxi). <strong>The</strong>re are<br />
important historical ideas in the human development paradigm that<br />
are to a significant extent based on Sen’s capability approach. And Sen<br />
was closely involved in the development of the Human Development<br />
<strong>Re</strong>ports that have been key in the maturing of the human development<br />
paradigm. Yet as some key contributors to this paradigm have rightly<br />
pointed out, it had other intellectual roots too, such as the basic needs<br />
approach (Streeten 1995; Fukuda-Parr 2003; Sen 2003a).<br />
<strong>The</strong> second reason is intellectual. <strong>The</strong> capability approach is used for<br />
a very wide range of purposes, as the account I presented in chapter 2<br />
makes amply clear. <strong>The</strong>se include purposes that are only tangentially, or<br />
very indirectly, related to human development concerns. For example,<br />
the philosopher Martin van Hees (2013) is interested in the structural<br />
properties of capabilities, especially how the formal analysis of rights<br />
fits into the capability concept. This research allows us to see how<br />
capabilities, as a concept, would fit in, <strong>and</strong> relate to, the existing literature<br />
on the structure of rights. But it would be a big stretch to say that this is<br />
also a contribution to the human development literature; in fact, I would<br />
find such a statement an implausible inflation of what we underst<strong>and</strong><br />
by ‘human development’. Rather, it is much more plausible to say that<br />
the study by Van Hees is a contribution to the capability literature, but<br />
not to the human development literature. If we were wrongly to equate<br />
the capability approach with the human development paradigm, this<br />
would create problems for underst<strong>and</strong>ing such a study as part of the<br />
capability approach.<br />
<strong>The</strong> third reason is practical. Those who have written about the<br />
human development paradigm stress that ‘development’ is about all<br />
people <strong>and</strong> all countries, <strong>and</strong> not only about countries which are often