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Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

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28 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

prescriptive — it entails a moral norm that tells us what we ought to do. 13<br />

Evaluative analyses <strong>and</strong> prescriptive analyses are closely intertwined,<br />

<strong>and</strong> often we first conduct an evaluative analysis, which is followed by<br />

a prescriptive analysis, e.g. by policy recommendations, as is done, for<br />

example, in the evaluative analysis of India’s development conducted<br />

by Jean Drèze <strong>and</strong> Amartya Sen (2013). However, one could also make<br />

an evaluative analysis while leaving the prescriptive analysis for<br />

someone else to make, perhaps leaving it to the agents who need to<br />

make the change themselves. For example, one can use the capability<br />

approach to make an evaluation or assessment of inequalities between<br />

men <strong>and</strong> women, without drawing prescriptive conclusions (Robeyns<br />

2003, 2006a). Or one can make a prescriptive analysis that is not based<br />

on an evaluation, because it is based on universal moral rules. Examples<br />

are the capability theories of justice by Nussbaum (2000; 2006b) <strong>and</strong><br />

Claassen (2016).<br />

<strong>The</strong> difference with the dominant terminology used by economists<br />

(<strong>and</strong> other social scientists) is that they only distinguish between two<br />

types of analysis: ‘positive’ versus ‘normative’ economics, whereby<br />

‘positive’ economics is seen as relying only on ‘facts’, whereas ‘normative<br />

economics’ also relies on values (e.g. <strong>Re</strong>iss 2013, 3). Hence economists<br />

do not distinguish between what philosophers call ‘evaluative analysis’<br />

<strong>and</strong> ‘normative analysis’ but rather lump them both together under<br />

the heading ‘normative analysis’. <strong>The</strong> main take-home message is that<br />

the capability approach is used predominantly in the field of ethical<br />

analysis (philosophers’ terminology) or normative analysis (economists’<br />

terminology), somewhat less often in the fields of descriptive analysis<br />

<strong>and</strong> conceptual analysis, <strong>and</strong> least in the field of explanatory analysis.<br />

We will revisit this in section 3.10, where we address whether the<br />

capability approach can be an explanatory theory.<br />

13 Alkire (2008) calls these normative applications “prospective analysis”, <strong>and</strong> argues<br />

that we need to distinguish the evaluative applications of the capability approach<br />

from the “prospective applications” of the capability approach. I agree, but since we<br />

should avoid introducing new terms when the terms needed are already available,<br />

it would be better to use the term ‘prescriptive applications’ or, as philosophers do,<br />

‘normative analysis’, rather than introducing ‘prospective applications’ as a new<br />

term.

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