Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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28 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
prescriptive — it entails a moral norm that tells us what we ought to do. 13<br />
Evaluative analyses <strong>and</strong> prescriptive analyses are closely intertwined,<br />
<strong>and</strong> often we first conduct an evaluative analysis, which is followed by<br />
a prescriptive analysis, e.g. by policy recommendations, as is done, for<br />
example, in the evaluative analysis of India’s development conducted<br />
by Jean Drèze <strong>and</strong> Amartya Sen (2013). However, one could also make<br />
an evaluative analysis while leaving the prescriptive analysis for<br />
someone else to make, perhaps leaving it to the agents who need to<br />
make the change themselves. For example, one can use the capability<br />
approach to make an evaluation or assessment of inequalities between<br />
men <strong>and</strong> women, without drawing prescriptive conclusions (Robeyns<br />
2003, 2006a). Or one can make a prescriptive analysis that is not based<br />
on an evaluation, because it is based on universal moral rules. Examples<br />
are the capability theories of justice by Nussbaum (2000; 2006b) <strong>and</strong><br />
Claassen (2016).<br />
<strong>The</strong> difference with the dominant terminology used by economists<br />
(<strong>and</strong> other social scientists) is that they only distinguish between two<br />
types of analysis: ‘positive’ versus ‘normative’ economics, whereby<br />
‘positive’ economics is seen as relying only on ‘facts’, whereas ‘normative<br />
economics’ also relies on values (e.g. <strong>Re</strong>iss 2013, 3). Hence economists<br />
do not distinguish between what philosophers call ‘evaluative analysis’<br />
<strong>and</strong> ‘normative analysis’ but rather lump them both together under<br />
the heading ‘normative analysis’. <strong>The</strong> main take-home message is that<br />
the capability approach is used predominantly in the field of ethical<br />
analysis (philosophers’ terminology) or normative analysis (economists’<br />
terminology), somewhat less often in the fields of descriptive analysis<br />
<strong>and</strong> conceptual analysis, <strong>and</strong> least in the field of explanatory analysis.<br />
We will revisit this in section 3.10, where we address whether the<br />
capability approach can be an explanatory theory.<br />
13 Alkire (2008) calls these normative applications “prospective analysis”, <strong>and</strong> argues<br />
that we need to distinguish the evaluative applications of the capability approach<br />
from the “prospective applications” of the capability approach. I agree, but since we<br />
should avoid introducing new terms when the terms needed are already available,<br />
it would be better to use the term ‘prescriptive applications’ or, as philosophers do,<br />
‘normative analysis’, rather than introducing ‘prospective applications’ as a new<br />
term.