Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
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applicability <strong>and</strong> measurement or (b) practical consequences, in the<br />
sense of action-guidance such as the establishment of normatively<br />
sound policy making or the question of which social arrangements we<br />
should want. <strong>The</strong> dominant contemporary philosophical literature on<br />
wellbeing is concerned with philosophical investigation in the sense<br />
of finding truths, <strong>and</strong> typically focussed on the entire lives of people<br />
from their own, first-person, perspective. That literature is much less<br />
concerned with wellbeing as an institutional value, with asking which<br />
account of wellbeing would be best when deciding what institutions<br />
we should implement — a question that can only be answered after<br />
taking feasibility considerations into account, or considering what<br />
would be best from the point of view of ethically sound policy making.<br />
However, as Alex<strong>and</strong>rova (2013, 311) rightly points out, “the context<br />
of an all-things-considered evaluation of life as a whole privileged by<br />
philosophers is just that: one of the many contexts in which wellbeing is<br />
in question”. Since most uses of the term ‘wellbeing’ in other debates,<br />
e.g. in applied philosophy or other disciplines, are concerned with<br />
overall evaluations of states of affairs <strong>and</strong>/or policy making, it shouldn’t<br />
surprise us that there is very little cross-fertilisation between those<br />
philosophical debates <strong>and</strong> the policy oriented <strong>and</strong> empirical literatures<br />
in other disciplines. This will have an influence on how we will, in the<br />
next section, answer the question how the capability approach fits into<br />
the st<strong>and</strong>ard typology of theories of wellbeing used in philosophy.<br />
<br />
philosophical wellbeing accounts<br />
In Appendix I of his influential book <strong>Re</strong>asons <strong>and</strong> Persons, Parfit (1984,<br />
493) suggests that we should make a distinction between three types of<br />
philosophical wellbeing theories.<br />
On Hedonistic <strong>The</strong>ories, what would be best for someone is what would<br />
make his life happiest. On Desire-Fulfilment <strong>The</strong>ories, what would be best<br />
for someone is what, throughout this life, would best fulfil his desires.<br />
On Objective List <strong>The</strong>ories, certain things are good or bad for us, whether<br />
or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.<br />
In interdisciplinary conversations, hedonistic theories are today<br />
better known under the label ‘happiness theories’. Interpreted from