Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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2. Core Ideas <strong>and</strong> the Framework<br />
75<br />
the content of which one must adopt, the B-modules, which are nonoptional<br />
but have optional content, <strong>and</strong> the C-modules, which are<br />
contingent — we can get a better grasp of the peculiar nature of the<br />
capability approach: not exactly a precise theory, but also not something<br />
that can be anything one likes it to be. I hope that this way of looking at<br />
the anatomy of the capability approach will help us to underst<strong>and</strong> what<br />
the approach is, but also provide more guidance to those who want to<br />
use the general capability approach as a guiding theoretical framework<br />
to work on particular theoretical or empirical issues <strong>and</strong> problems.<br />
<strong>The</strong> content of the A-module, the B-modules <strong>and</strong> C-modules is,<br />
as with everything in scholarship, a proposal that can be modified<br />
to accommodate new insights. If someone has convincing arguments<br />
why one element or module should be deleted, modified, or added,<br />
then that should be done. Given what we know from the history of<br />
scholarship, it is rather unlikely that no further modifications will be<br />
proposed in the future.<br />
<br />
In the previous sections, we have seen which modules are core in a<br />
capability theory, which ones need to be addressed but have optional<br />
content, <strong>and</strong> which ones may or may not be necessary to add to a<br />
particular capability theory. One question that this modular view raises is<br />
what we should think of a theory or an application that uses the addition<br />
of normative principles that are in contradiction with a property of the<br />
A-module. For example, suppose one would want to add the normative<br />
principle that institutions <strong>and</strong> personal behaviour should honour the<br />
traditions of one’s local community. <strong>The</strong>re may be aspects of those<br />
traditions that are in tension with the principle of treating each person<br />
as an end, for example, because women are not given the same moral<br />
status in those traditions as men. What should we then say? Would such<br />
a theory no longer be a capability theory, even if the bulk of the theory is<br />
trying to think about the quality of life <strong>and</strong> desirable institutions in terms<br />
of the enhancement of functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities?<br />
I propose that we introduce the notion of a hybrid theory — theories<br />
or applications that use the notions of ‘functionings’ <strong>and</strong> ‘capabilities’