06.09.2021 Views

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

148 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

<br />

on theories of justice<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> is an essentially contested concept: there is no generally accepted<br />

definition of justice, <strong>and</strong> thus no consensus on what the appropriate<br />

subject matter of theories of justice is or should be. Of course, it does not<br />

follow that nothing at all can be said about the notion of justice. David<br />

Miller’s description of social justice is a good starting point. He claims<br />

that when arguing about justice, we are discussing:<br />

how the good <strong>and</strong> bad things in life should be distributed among the<br />

members of a human society. When, more concretely, we attack some<br />

policy or some state of affairs as socially unjust, we are claiming that a<br />

person, or more usually a category of persons, enjoys fewer advantages<br />

than that person or group of persons ought to enjoy (or bears more of<br />

the burdens than they ought to bear), given how other members of the<br />

society in question are faring. (Miller 1999, 1)<br />

<strong>The</strong>ories of justice do not cover the entire spectrum of moral issues.<br />

<strong>Social</strong> justice theorists generally agree that parts of morality fall outside<br />

the scope of justice. Charity is such a case: you may not have a duty<br />

of justice to help a frail, elderly neighbour, but you may nevertheless<br />

decide to help that person as an act of charity <strong>and</strong> compassion. Another<br />

example is morally laudable behaviour, such as being a volunteer for<br />

social activities in your neighbourhood. Such behaviour may be morally<br />

praiseworthy, but it may at the same time not be required as a matter of<br />

justice. Hence, justice is not all that matters, if we consider how to make<br />

the world morally better.<br />

Can we describe justice, <strong>and</strong> theories of justice, by their properties, as<br />

philosophers often do? First, justice is a property that has been ascribed<br />

to both individuals <strong>and</strong> institutions: justice is a virtue of individuals<br />

in their interactions with others, <strong>and</strong> justice is also a virtue of social<br />

institutions (Barry <strong>and</strong> Matravers 2011). Thus, we can say that a certain<br />

society is more or less just, or we can say that the behaviour of some<br />

persons is just or unjust. <strong>The</strong>orists of justice tend primarily to discuss<br />

the justice of social arrangements, that is, of social institutions broadly<br />

defined; justice as an individual virtue is sometimes regarded as a<br />

matter of ethics rather than of political philosophy (although not every<br />

political philosopher would agree with this way of demarcating justice

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!