Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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148 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
<br />
on theories of justice<br />
<strong>Justice</strong> is an essentially contested concept: there is no generally accepted<br />
definition of justice, <strong>and</strong> thus no consensus on what the appropriate<br />
subject matter of theories of justice is or should be. Of course, it does not<br />
follow that nothing at all can be said about the notion of justice. David<br />
Miller’s description of social justice is a good starting point. He claims<br />
that when arguing about justice, we are discussing:<br />
how the good <strong>and</strong> bad things in life should be distributed among the<br />
members of a human society. When, more concretely, we attack some<br />
policy or some state of affairs as socially unjust, we are claiming that a<br />
person, or more usually a category of persons, enjoys fewer advantages<br />
than that person or group of persons ought to enjoy (or bears more of<br />
the burdens than they ought to bear), given how other members of the<br />
society in question are faring. (Miller 1999, 1)<br />
<strong>The</strong>ories of justice do not cover the entire spectrum of moral issues.<br />
<strong>Social</strong> justice theorists generally agree that parts of morality fall outside<br />
the scope of justice. Charity is such a case: you may not have a duty<br />
of justice to help a frail, elderly neighbour, but you may nevertheless<br />
decide to help that person as an act of charity <strong>and</strong> compassion. Another<br />
example is morally laudable behaviour, such as being a volunteer for<br />
social activities in your neighbourhood. Such behaviour may be morally<br />
praiseworthy, but it may at the same time not be required as a matter of<br />
justice. Hence, justice is not all that matters, if we consider how to make<br />
the world morally better.<br />
Can we describe justice, <strong>and</strong> theories of justice, by their properties, as<br />
philosophers often do? First, justice is a property that has been ascribed<br />
to both individuals <strong>and</strong> institutions: justice is a virtue of individuals<br />
in their interactions with others, <strong>and</strong> justice is also a virtue of social<br />
institutions (Barry <strong>and</strong> Matravers 2011). Thus, we can say that a certain<br />
society is more or less just, or we can say that the behaviour of some<br />
persons is just or unjust. <strong>The</strong>orists of justice tend primarily to discuss<br />
the justice of social arrangements, that is, of social institutions broadly<br />
defined; justice as an individual virtue is sometimes regarded as a<br />
matter of ethics rather than of political philosophy (although not every<br />
political philosopher would agree with this way of demarcating justice