Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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48 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
the preconditions — the means <strong>and</strong> the enabling circumstances — for<br />
those capabilities are in place. We must ask whether people are able<br />
to be healthy, <strong>and</strong> whether the means or resources necessary for this<br />
capability, such as clean water, adequate sanitation, access to doctors,<br />
protection from infections <strong>and</strong> diseases <strong>and</strong> basic knowledge on health<br />
issues are present. We must ask whether people are well-nourished, <strong>and</strong><br />
whether the means or conditions for the realization of this capability,<br />
such as having sufficient food supplies <strong>and</strong> food entitlements, are<br />
being met. We must ask whether people have access to a high-quality<br />
education system, to real political participation, <strong>and</strong> to community<br />
activities that support them, that enable them to cope with struggles in<br />
daily life, <strong>and</strong> that foster caring friendships. Hence we do need to take<br />
the means into account, but we can only do so if we first know what the<br />
ends are.<br />
Many of the arguments that capability theorists have advanced<br />
against alternative normative frameworks can be traced back to the<br />
objection that alternative approaches focus on particular means to<br />
wellbeing rather than the ends. 24 <strong>The</strong>re are two important reasons why<br />
the capability approach dictates that we have to start our analysis from<br />
the ends rather than the means. Firstly, people differ in their ability to<br />
convert means into valuable opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes<br />
(functionings) (Sen 1992a, 26–28, 36–38). Since ends are what ultimately<br />
matter when thinking about wellbeing <strong>and</strong> the quality of life, means can<br />
only work as fully reliable proxies of people’s opportunities to achieve<br />
those ends if all people have the same capacities or powers to convert<br />
those means into equal capability sets. This is an assumption that goes<br />
against a core characteristic of the capability approach, namely claim<br />
A3 — the inter-individual differences in the conversion of resources<br />
into functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities. <strong>Capability</strong> scholars believe that these<br />
inter-individual differences are far-reaching <strong>and</strong> significant, <strong>and</strong> hence<br />
this also explains why the idea of conversion factors is a compulsory<br />
option in the capability approach (see 2.6.3). <strong>The</strong>ories that focus on<br />
24 This is a critique that the capability approach shares with the happiness approach,<br />
which also focusses on what it considers to be an end in itself — happiness. Still,<br />
capability scholars have reasons why they do not endorse the singular focus on<br />
happiness, as the happiness approach proposes. See section 3.8.