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Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

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4. Critiques <strong>and</strong> Debates<br />

185<br />

live their lives <strong>and</strong> about their relation to society. In this view, society is<br />

built up from individuals only, <strong>and</strong> hence is nothing more than the sum<br />

of individuals <strong>and</strong> their properties. Similarly, explanatory individualism<br />

is the doctrine that all social phenomena can in principle be explained<br />

in terms of individuals <strong>and</strong> their properties.<br />

<strong>The</strong> crucial issue here is that a commitment to normative<br />

individualism is not incompatible with an ontology that recognises<br />

the connections between people, their social relations, <strong>and</strong> their social<br />

embedment. Similarly, a social policy focussing on <strong>and</strong> targeting certain<br />

groups or communities can be perfectly compatible with normative<br />

individualism.<br />

As I argued in section 2.6.8, the capability approach embraces<br />

normative individualism — <strong>and</strong> this is, for reasons given there, a<br />

desirable property. However, it also follows from the discussion on the<br />

importance of structural constraints (section 2.7.5) that the capability<br />

approach does not rely on ontological individualism.<br />

Clearly, scholars have divergent (implicit) social theories, <strong>and</strong><br />

hence some attach more importance to social structures than others do.<br />

Nevertheless, I fail to see how the capability approach can be understood<br />

to be methodologically or ontologically individualistic, especially since<br />

Sen himself has analysed some processes that are profoundly collective,<br />

such as his analysis of households as sites of cooperative conflict (1990a).<br />

In later work too, he acknowledged persons as socially embedded, as<br />

the following quote from his joint work illustrates:<br />

<strong>The</strong> [capability] approach used in this study is much concerned with the<br />

opportunities that people have to improve the quality of their lives. It<br />

is essentially a ‘people-centered’ approach, which puts human agency<br />

(rather than organizations such as markets or governments) at the<br />

centre of the stage. <strong>The</strong> crucial role of social opportunities is to exp<strong>and</strong><br />

the realm of human agency <strong>and</strong> freedom, both as an end in itself <strong>and</strong><br />

as a means of further expansion of freedom. <strong>The</strong> word ‘social’ in the<br />

expression ‘social opportunity’ […] is a useful reminder not to view<br />

individuals <strong>and</strong> their opportunities in isolated terms. <strong>The</strong> options that a<br />

person has depend greatly on relations with others <strong>and</strong> on what the state<br />

<strong>and</strong> other institutions do. We shall be particularly concerned with those<br />

opportunities that are strongly influenced by social circumstances <strong>and</strong><br />

public policy […]. (Drèze <strong>and</strong> Sen 2002: 6)

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