Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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170 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
for the inclusion of ‘power’ into the capability approach. Should the<br />
capability approach pay much more attention to political economy?<br />
Section 4.8 asks whether the capability approach is a liberal theory,<br />
<strong>and</strong> whether it can be anything other than a liberal theory. Section 4.9<br />
argues that, despite the many references to ‘the human development<br />
<strong>and</strong> capability approaches’, these are not the same thing. Finally,<br />
section 4.10 discusses the potential <strong>and</strong> problems of a capabilitarian<br />
welfare economics.<br />
<br />
genuinely a capability?<br />
Since this chapter is the place to collect critiques <strong>and</strong> debates, let me<br />
start with a very basic point of criticism: not everything that is called<br />
‘a capability’ in the capability literature is, upon closer examination,<br />
genuinely a capability. <strong>The</strong> main criticism that I want to offer in this<br />
brief section is that we should be very careful in our choices of terms<br />
<strong>and</strong> concepts: not everything that is important is a capability, <strong>and</strong> it<br />
is conceptually confusing (<strong>and</strong> hence wrong) to call everything that is<br />
important a capability. As an interdisciplinary language used in many<br />
different disciplines, the capability approach already suffers from<br />
sloppy use of terms because of interdisciplinary differences in their<br />
usage, <strong>and</strong> we should avoid contributing to this conceptual confusion.<br />
Let me give one example to illustrate the critique.<br />
In her book Allocating the Earth as well as in earlier work, Breena<br />
Holl<strong>and</strong> (2008, 2014) argues that the role of the environment in making<br />
capabilities possible is so important <strong>and</strong> central that we should<br />
conceptualize environmental ecological functioning (that is, the<br />
ecosystem services that the environment offers to human beings) as<br />
a meta-capability that underlies all other capabilities. As Holl<strong>and</strong> puts<br />
it, “the environment’s ecological functioning is a meta-capability in<br />
the sense that it is a precondition of all the capabilities that Nussbaum<br />
defines as necessary for living a good human life” (2014, 112). By<br />
using this terminology, Holl<strong>and</strong> wants to stress that protecting<br />
the ecosystem is not just one way among many equally good ways<br />
to contribute to human wellbeing — rather, it is a crucial <strong>and</strong> nonsubstitutable<br />
precondition for living. Yet one could question whether<br />
conceptualizing it as a “meta-capability” is correct. As I have argued