Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
163<br />
human rights, that is, what kinds of harms or abuses should they protect<br />
us from? What kind of rights are human rights — are they moral claims,<br />
or legal claims, or political claims, or something else? <strong>The</strong> question<br />
of justification asks: on what grounds can we say that people have<br />
human rights? Is it because humans have rational capacities or agency?<br />
If so, does that mean that newborn babies do not have human rights?<br />
All these questions are studied in the vast philosophical literature on<br />
human rights.<br />
Note that while the relationship between normative political<br />
philosophy, justice <strong>and</strong> human rights is not entirely disputed, the<br />
dominant view in the contemporary literature is that the domain of<br />
human rights is a subset of the domain of justice, which in turn is a<br />
subset of the domain of morality. <strong>The</strong> reason is that “[n]ot everything<br />
that is desirable to be realized in politics is a matter of human rights,<br />
<strong>and</strong> not everything that is a matter of justice is a matter of human rights.<br />
Human rights constitute the most urgent dem<strong>and</strong> of basic global justice”<br />
(Gilabert 2009, 676).<br />
Legal scholars are interested in questions related to the treaties <strong>and</strong><br />
constitutions in which human rights are codified. <strong>The</strong> idea of human<br />
rights gained momentum with the 1948 adoption of the Universal<br />
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which over time received a<br />
canonical status in legal <strong>and</strong> political debates. <strong>The</strong> UDHR subsequently<br />
served as a template for human rights instruments that are legally<br />
binding, such as the International Covenant on Civil <strong>and</strong> Political Rights,<br />
the International Covenant on Economic, <strong>Social</strong> <strong>and</strong> Cultural Rights,<br />
the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention<br />
on Human Rights <strong>and</strong> the African Charter of Human <strong>and</strong> People’s<br />
Rights. One question this raises is to what extent national constitutions<br />
are consistent with those legally binding treaties, or with the UDHR.<br />
Another question frequently asked by legal scholars is to what extent<br />
national jurisprudence can be in tension with — <strong>and</strong> violate — a human<br />
right that is part of an international treaty to which that particular<br />
nation signed up. For example, in the famous ‘Lautsi case’, the question<br />
emerged whether the Italian state’s policy to have a compulsory crucifix<br />
in the classroom of public schools was in violation of the human right<br />
to the freedom of religion as codified in the European Convention on<br />
Human Rights (Weiler 2010; Pierik 2012; Pierik <strong>and</strong> van der Burg 2011).