Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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4. Critiques <strong>and</strong> Debates<br />
203<br />
<br />
Before analysing the reach <strong>and</strong> limit of the capability approach in<br />
these various endeavours, a few general comments are in order<br />
about economics in general, <strong>and</strong> welfare economics in particular.<br />
Let us first ask: what is welfare economics? As Sen (1996, 50) writes,<br />
“Welfare economics deals with the basis of normative judgements,<br />
the foundations of evaluative measurement, <strong>and</strong> the conceptual<br />
underpinnings of policy-making in economics”. While, in practice,<br />
much of the economics discipline is concerned with policy advice,<br />
welfare economics is nevertheless a small subfield of economics, <strong>and</strong><br />
is by some prominent welfare economists seen as unduly neglected<br />
or marginalised by mainstream economics (Atkinson 2001). One<br />
important reason is that welfare economics makes explicit the inevitable<br />
normative dimensions of economic policy analysis <strong>and</strong> evaluations,<br />
<strong>and</strong> most economists have been socialised to believe that ‘modern<br />
economics’ is value-free, <strong>and</strong> that anything to do with normativity can<br />
be outsourced to ethics or to a democratic vote. In reality, however, the<br />
imaginary science-value split that mainstream economists would wish<br />
for is, for many economic questions, impossible (<strong>Re</strong>iss 2013; Hausman,<br />
McPherson <strong>and</strong> Satz 2016). It would therefore be much better to face<br />
this inevitability upfront, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> economics as a moral science<br />
(Boulding 1969; Atkinson 2009; Shiller <strong>and</strong> Shiller 2011) rather than as<br />
applied mathematics or a form of value-free modelling. But in economics,<br />
as in any other discipline, there are complicated sociological processes<br />
conveying views about authority <strong>and</strong> status, as well as unexamined<br />
beliefs about what ‘good science’ is <strong>and</strong> which type of objectivity is most<br />
desirable: one is not born an economist, but becomes one through one’s<br />
training, which is in part also a socialisation process (Col<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong><br />
Klamer 1987; McCloskey 1998; Nelson 2002). Unfortunately, there is<br />
empirical evidence that many economists are unwilling to engage with<br />
these fundamental questions <strong>and</strong> hold on to the belief that economics<br />
is superior to other social sciences <strong>and</strong> has little to learn from other<br />
disciplines (Fourcade, Ollion <strong>and</strong> Algan 2015). Many economists who<br />
are interested in economic questions but are not endorsing the myth<br />
of value-free social science, or who crave more methodological <strong>and</strong><br />
meta-theoretical freedom, have left for another discipline that offers