Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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208 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
which requires other methods <strong>and</strong> techniques that allow for fuzziness,<br />
vagueness <strong>and</strong> complexity (Chiappero-Martinetti 2008, 2000, 1994, 2006;<br />
Clark <strong>and</strong> Qizilbash 2005; Qizilbash <strong>and</strong> Clark 2005). One could also<br />
advance work on dominance rankings or incomplete rankings, which<br />
Sen has been defending in his social choice work for several decades<br />
(e.g. Sen 2017). As a consequence, there are several ways to develop a<br />
capabilitarian welfare economics, <strong>and</strong> to make the capability approach<br />
“operational” (Atkinson 1999, 185).<br />
Sugden’s objection can be best answered by looking at the applications<br />
that have already been developed, <strong>and</strong> which have been listed in<br />
several overviews of the empirical literature (e.g. Kuklys <strong>and</strong> Robeyns<br />
2005; Robeyns 2006b; Chiappero-Martinetti <strong>and</strong> Roche 2009; Lessmann<br />
2012). 17 However, whether the applications discussed in those surveys<br />
satisfy the critics depends on what one expects from empirical work in<br />
capabilitarian welfare economics. As was already shown in chapter 1,<br />
empirical applications of the capability approach do make a substantive<br />
difference to research using other normative frameworks, such as<br />
income-based metrics. But from that it doesn’t follow that capabilitarian<br />
welfare economics will be able to deliver alternatives for each <strong>and</strong> every<br />
existing welfarist study in economics. It may well be that sometimes the<br />
informational riches of the capability approach clash with requirements<br />
regarding measurability that certain empirical applications put upon<br />
the scholar.<br />
<br />
welfare economics?<br />
In the last two sections, we discussed how the capability approach can<br />
make a difference to contemporary welfare economics both theoretically<br />
<strong>and</strong> empirically. Those debates by <strong>and</strong> large stay within the mainstream<br />
of contemporary welfare economics, even though as Amartya Sen (1996,<br />
61) notes, they require us “to go more <strong>and</strong> more in these pluralist <strong>and</strong><br />
17 In addition to the first, rather rough empirical application in the Appendix of Sen’s<br />
(1985a) Commodities <strong>and</strong> Capabilities, the literature on empirical applications in<br />
welfare economics that used individual-level data started off with the paper by<br />
Schokkaert <strong>and</strong> Van Ootegem (1990), in which they showed that unemployment<br />
benefits may restore an unemployed person’s income level, but do not restore all of<br />
her functionings to the level they were at before she become unemployed.