Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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2. Core Ideas <strong>and</strong> the Framework<br />
51<br />
income), but rather explicitly ask the question: which types of means are<br />
important for the fostering <strong>and</strong> nurturing of a particular capability, or<br />
set of capabilities? For some capabilities, the most important means will<br />
indeed be financial resources <strong>and</strong> economic production, but for others it<br />
may be a change in political practices <strong>and</strong> institutions, such as effective<br />
guarantees <strong>and</strong> protections of freedom of thought, political participation,<br />
social or cultural practices, social structures, social institutions, public<br />
goods, social norms, <strong>and</strong> traditions <strong>and</strong> habits. As a consequence, an<br />
effective capability-enhancing policy may not be increasing disposable<br />
income, but rather fighting a homophobic, ethnophobic, racist or sexist<br />
social climate.<br />
<br />
as the evaluative space<br />
If a capability theory is a normative theory (as is often the case), then<br />
functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities form the entire evaluative space, or are<br />
part of the evaluative space. 28 A normative theory is a theory that entails<br />
a value judgement: something is better than or worse than something<br />
else. This value judgement can be used to compare the position of<br />
different persons or states of affairs (as in inequality analysis) or it can<br />
be used to judge one course of action as ‘better’ than another course of<br />
action (as in policy design). For all these types of normative theories, we<br />
need normative claims, since concepts alone cannot ground normativity.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first normative claim which each capability theory should<br />
respect is thus that functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities form the ‘evaluative<br />
space’. According to the capability approach, the ends of wellbeing<br />
freedom, justice, <strong>and</strong> development should be conceptualized in terms<br />
of people’s functionings <strong>and</strong>/or capabilities. This claim is not contested<br />
28 I am using the term ‘normative’ here in the way it is used by social scientists, hence<br />
encompassing what philosophers call both ‘normative’ <strong>and</strong> ‘evaluative’. For these<br />
different uses of terminology, see section 2.2. It is also possible to use the notions<br />
of ‘functionings’ <strong>and</strong> ‘capabilities’ for non-normative purposes (see section 3.10). In<br />
that case, the basic notions from the core are all that one takes from the capability<br />
approach; one does not need this normative part of the core. I will suggest in the<br />
concluding chapter 5 that explanatory applications of the capability approach are<br />
part of how it could be fruitfully developed in the future.