Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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110 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
should be the goal, rather than equality of outcome (functionings). On<br />
the one h<strong>and</strong>, the responsibility-sensitivity principle is widely endorsed<br />
not only in political philosophy but also in the mathematical models<br />
being developed in normative welfare economics. If one wants to<br />
endorse <strong>and</strong> implement this principle of responsibility-sensitivity, then<br />
specifications <strong>and</strong> applications of the capability approach should focus<br />
on capabilities, rather than functionings. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, scholars<br />
have objected to the weight given to personal responsibility, both within<br />
the highly abstract theorising about ideals <strong>and</strong> when considering more<br />
applied <strong>and</strong> practical issues. At a highly abstract theoretical level,<br />
philosophers disagree on whether we should endorse responsibilitysensitivity<br />
in developing the capability approach (Fleurbaey 2002;<br />
Vallentyne 2005; Wolff <strong>and</strong> De-Shalit 2007). Moreover, for applied<br />
work, serious epistemological hurdles may ultimately lead us to drop<br />
the responsibility-sensitivity principle for practical reasoning about<br />
the actual world: in practice, it is often impossible to know what the<br />
causal factors were that led someone to make decisions that lowered<br />
her achieved wellbeing, <strong>and</strong> hence it is difficult or even impossible to<br />
know whether the causal factors are those for which one could be held<br />
morally responsible or not.<br />
Thirdly, there may be institutional considerations that have an influence<br />
on whether we choose functionings, capabilities, or a mixture (Robeyns<br />
2016b). Take the example of a government that has, with the broad<br />
support of the population, set up a welfare state arrangement, which<br />
includes certain welfare rights. <strong>The</strong>n this government may dem<strong>and</strong><br />
from citizens who want to be part of this societal arrangement that they<br />
proactively aim to master, secure, or maintain certain functionings,<br />
such as being able to read <strong>and</strong> write, or to speak a language that does<br />
not exclude one from holding a job. A welfare state arrangement that<br />
offers citizens relatively generous welfare rights can legitimately induce<br />
or perhaps even force citizens <strong>and</strong> legal residents to choose certain<br />
functionings that are needed in order to justly participate in that welfare<br />
state arrangement. But here, again, one has to pay attention to detail <strong>and</strong><br />
be careful, since we would want to distinguish between those who didn’t<br />
exercise a functioning but had the capability versus those who didn’t<br />
exercise a functioning but due to inability didn’t have the capability in<br />
the first place. For example, if the political community believes that it is