Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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100 <strong>Wellbeing</strong>, <strong>Freedom</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />
Let us start from the clearest concept in Berlin — his notion of<br />
negative freedom — which Berlin (1969, 122) defines as follows: “I am<br />
normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men<br />
interferes with my activity”. <strong>The</strong> opposite of having negative freedom is<br />
being coerced — the deliberate interference of other persons in an area<br />
of my life in which I could, without the interference, act freely. Negative<br />
freedom thus corresponds to freedom as non-interference, <strong>and</strong> Berlin<br />
speaks approvingly of this kind of freedom: “[…] non-interference,<br />
which is the opposite of coercion, is good as such, although it is not<br />
the only good. This is the ‘negative’ conception of liberty in its classical<br />
form” (1969, 128).<br />
On positive freedom, there is much less clarity in Berlin’s work.<br />
Berlin first introduces positive freedom as the freedom to be one’s own<br />
master:<br />
I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I<br />
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious<br />
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were,<br />
from outside. I wish to be a somebody, not nobody, a doer — deciding,<br />
not being decided for; self-directed <strong>and</strong> not acted upon by external nature<br />
or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of<br />
playing a human role, that is, conceiving goals <strong>and</strong> policies of my own<br />
<strong>and</strong> realizing them. (Berlin 1969, 131)<br />
Berlin argues that the metaphor of self-mastery historically developed<br />
into the idea that a person has two selves, a dominant self which is<br />
identified with reason <strong>and</strong> a ‘higher nature’, <strong>and</strong> a ‘heteronomous self’<br />
which follows desires <strong>and</strong> passions <strong>and</strong> needs to be disciplined. Berlin<br />
continues that the first self, the ‘real self’, may become seen as wider<br />
than the individual,<br />
as a social whole of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a<br />
race, a church, a state, the great society of the living <strong>and</strong> the dead <strong>and</strong> the<br />
yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which,<br />
by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’ single will upon its recalcitrant<br />
‘members’ achieves its own, <strong>and</strong> therefore their ‘higher freedom’. (Berlin<br />
1969, 132)<br />
Put differently, men are “coerced in the name of some goal (let us<br />
say, justice or public health) which they would if they were more<br />
enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or