Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
99<br />
of the capability approach (e.g. Cohen 1993; Gasper <strong>and</strong> Van Staveren<br />
2003; Hill 2003; Okin 2003, 291–92). Let us therefore clarify <strong>and</strong> analyse<br />
the conceptualisation of capabilities as freedom by answering three<br />
questions. First, capabilities have been described as positive freedoms,<br />
but how should we underst<strong>and</strong> that notion, <strong>and</strong> is that the best way to<br />
describe what kind of freedoms capabilities are? (Section 3.3.1) Secondly,<br />
is there a better conceptualisation of freedom that captures what<br />
capabilities are? (Section 3.3.2) Thirdly, if it is the case that capabilities<br />
can coherently be conceptualised as freedoms, are capabilities then<br />
best understood as freedoms, or is it better to avoid that terminology?<br />
(Section 3.3.3).<br />
<br />
Sen has often used the distinction between positive <strong>and</strong> negative<br />
freedoms, thereby describing capabilities as positive freedoms. For<br />
example, Sen (1984b, 315) has stated that he is trying “to outline a<br />
characterization of positive freedoms in the form of capabilities of<br />
persons”. 3 In some discourses, especially in the social sciences, the term<br />
‘positive freedoms’ is used to refer to access to certain valuable goods,<br />
such as the freedom to affordable high quality health care or education.<br />
Positive freedoms are contrasted with negative freedoms, which refer<br />
to the absence of interference by others, such as the freedom to own a<br />
gun. 4 Yet these are by no means st<strong>and</strong>ard underst<strong>and</strong>ings of positive<br />
<strong>and</strong> negative freedom.<br />
In making the claim that capabilities are positive freedoms, Sen<br />
often approvingly refers to Isaiah Berlin’s canonical distinction between<br />
positive <strong>and</strong> negative freedom, but unfortunately doesn’t explain in<br />
detail how we should read Berlin. This is potentially confusing, since<br />
Berlin’s use of the term ‘positive freedom’ is far from crystal clear.<br />
3 Other statements equating capabilities with positive freedoms can be found in<br />
Sen (1982, 6, 38–39; 1984c, 78, 86; 1985c, 201; 2008, 18 among other places). In his<br />
1979 Tanner lecture in which Sen coined the term ‘capability’, he did not refer to<br />
freedoms, but did use other terms such as ‘ability’ <strong>and</strong> ‘power’.<br />
4 According to Sen (2009c, 282) this is the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of positive <strong>and</strong> negative<br />
freedom in welfare economics.