Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
137<br />
brings to their lives. <strong>The</strong> capability approach can capture this — taking<br />
on a difficult <strong>and</strong> challenging project such as writing a PhD dissertation<br />
can plausibly be conceptualised as a general functioning (consisting of<br />
a set of more specific functionings) that we may want to include in our<br />
capability analyses, including in our capabilitarian theories of wellbeing<br />
for public policies.<br />
I would thus defend the position that various roles for happiness are<br />
potentially possible within capability theories, <strong>and</strong> that it depends on<br />
the exact purpose <strong>and</strong> scope of the capability theory or application, as<br />
well as the aim that wellbeing plays in that capability theory, what the<br />
best role (if any) for both the affective <strong>and</strong> cognitive aspects of happiness<br />
would be.<br />
<br />
preferences<br />
As we saw in the previous section, a widely-voiced reason offered<br />
for rejecting the happiness approach as an account of wellbeing is the<br />
phenomenon of adaptive preferences, which has been widely discussed<br />
in the literature (e.g. Elster 1983; Sen 1985c, 3, 1992a; Nussbaum 2000;<br />
Teschl <strong>and</strong> Comim 2005; Burchardt 2009; Khader 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013;<br />
Conradie <strong>and</strong> Robeyns 2013). Phenomena of mental adaption are a<br />
problem if we take happiness or desire-satisfaction to be our account<br />
of wellbeing. Yet we also concluded in section 3.7.3 that the capability<br />
approach sometimes boils down to a desire-fulfilment account of<br />
wellbeing. Hence we need to ask: how do processes of adaptation affect<br />
the desire-fulfilment view of wellbeing, <strong>and</strong> what are the implications<br />
for the capability approach?<br />
In the most general terms, preferences formation or adaptation is<br />
the phenomenon whereby the subjective assessment of one’s wellbeing<br />
is out of line with the objective situation. Two persons who find<br />
themselves in the same objective situation will have a very different<br />
subjective assessment, because one is happy with small amounts of<br />
‘objective goods’, whereas the other is much more dem<strong>and</strong>ing. In the<br />
capability literature, the general concern is with deprived persons<br />
who, over time, adapt to their objectively poor circumstances, <strong>and</strong><br />
report a level of subjective wellbeing which is higher than the objective<br />
circumstances warrant.