Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a
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3. Clarifications<br />
107<br />
philosopher, there is therefore less reason to be worried about being<br />
misunderstood when referring to capabilities as option freedoms, or as<br />
opportunity freedoms.<br />
<br />
We now move to examine the issue that is central to module B6: should<br />
we, when developing a capability analysis or capability theory, focus on<br />
functionings, capabilities, or a mixture of both? After all, this question<br />
is not settled. It is one of the core features of the capability approach<br />
that it uses ‘functionings’ <strong>and</strong> ‘capabilities’ as core notions (property<br />
A1, as discussed in 2.6.1) <strong>and</strong> that every capability analysis endorses<br />
the claim that functionings <strong>and</strong>/or capabilities form the evaluative space<br />
(property A5, as discussed in 2.6.5). But this still leaves the question<br />
unanswered whether we should focus on functionings, or on capabilities<br />
or on a combination of functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities. Perhaps we have<br />
good reasons sometimes to focus on functionings, <strong>and</strong> sometimes<br />
on capabilities, for example for different types of applications, or for<br />
different groups of people?<br />
Luckily, this question is not new to the capability literature, <strong>and</strong><br />
there is by now a lively debate with many different types of arguments<br />
about whether the appropriate wellbeing metric should be capabilities<br />
or functionings, hence opportunities or achievements. What reasons or<br />
considerations have been argued to be relevant for this choice? 7<br />
<strong>The</strong> first consideration concerns anti-paternalism. It is a normative<br />
consideration: by focusing on capabilities rather than functionings, we<br />
do not force people into a particular account of good lives but instead<br />
aim at a range of possible ways of life from which each person can<br />
choose. Thus, it is the liberal nature of the capability approach, or an<br />
anti-paternalist commitment, that motivates a principled choice of<br />
capabilities rather than functionings. Obviously, the strength of this<br />
argument depends on how bad one takes paternalism to be. <strong>The</strong>re may<br />
be good reasons to believe that some paternalism is unavoidable, or<br />
even desired (Nussbaum 2000, 51–56; Robeyns 2016b). Moreover, some<br />
7 General discussions surveying different reasons to choose for functionings,<br />
capabilities or both, can also be found in Robeyns <strong>and</strong> Van der Veen (2007, 45–99,<br />
76–78), Hick <strong>and</strong> Burchardt (2016, 79–82) <strong>and</strong> Robeyns (2016b).