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Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice The Capability Approach Re-Examined, 2017a

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3. Clarifications<br />

107<br />

philosopher, there is therefore less reason to be worried about being<br />

misunderstood when referring to capabilities as option freedoms, or as<br />

opportunity freedoms.<br />

<br />

We now move to examine the issue that is central to module B6: should<br />

we, when developing a capability analysis or capability theory, focus on<br />

functionings, capabilities, or a mixture of both? After all, this question<br />

is not settled. It is one of the core features of the capability approach<br />

that it uses ‘functionings’ <strong>and</strong> ‘capabilities’ as core notions (property<br />

A1, as discussed in 2.6.1) <strong>and</strong> that every capability analysis endorses<br />

the claim that functionings <strong>and</strong>/or capabilities form the evaluative space<br />

(property A5, as discussed in 2.6.5). But this still leaves the question<br />

unanswered whether we should focus on functionings, or on capabilities<br />

or on a combination of functionings <strong>and</strong> capabilities. Perhaps we have<br />

good reasons sometimes to focus on functionings, <strong>and</strong> sometimes<br />

on capabilities, for example for different types of applications, or for<br />

different groups of people?<br />

Luckily, this question is not new to the capability literature, <strong>and</strong><br />

there is by now a lively debate with many different types of arguments<br />

about whether the appropriate wellbeing metric should be capabilities<br />

or functionings, hence opportunities or achievements. What reasons or<br />

considerations have been argued to be relevant for this choice? 7<br />

<strong>The</strong> first consideration concerns anti-paternalism. It is a normative<br />

consideration: by focusing on capabilities rather than functionings, we<br />

do not force people into a particular account of good lives but instead<br />

aim at a range of possible ways of life from which each person can<br />

choose. Thus, it is the liberal nature of the capability approach, or an<br />

anti-paternalist commitment, that motivates a principled choice of<br />

capabilities rather than functionings. Obviously, the strength of this<br />

argument depends on how bad one takes paternalism to be. <strong>The</strong>re may<br />

be good reasons to believe that some paternalism is unavoidable, or<br />

even desired (Nussbaum 2000, 51–56; Robeyns 2016b). Moreover, some<br />

7 General discussions surveying different reasons to choose for functionings,<br />

capabilities or both, can also be found in Robeyns <strong>and</strong> Van der Veen (2007, 45–99,<br />

76–78), Hick <strong>and</strong> Burchardt (2016, 79–82) <strong>and</strong> Robeyns (2016b).

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