Philo of Alexandria - Books and Journals

critical studies 1998 75
9840.F.Deutsch,‘LaphilautiechezPhilond’Alexandrie,’inC.Lévy
(ed.), Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie, Monothéismes et
Philosophie (Turnhout 1998) 87–98.
The term ιλαυτία does not originate with Philo, but he does use it rather
frequently. For this usage he is indebted to Plato and Aristotle, but he adds to
the reflection of his predecessors the inspiration of his Jewish convictions, as the
author shows in discussing the more important Philonic texts on this subject,
which concentrate on two major figures, Cain and Pharaoh (Det. 32, 78, 103,
Sacr. 51, Conf. 128, Post. 35, Leg. 3.12, Cher. 74). As negation of the God and
the Beautiful, philautia above all focuses on leisure and pleasure. In regarding
himself as the cause of all things, the philautos pursues every path of unreason,
illustrating the confrontation of the sensible and the intelligible. When philautia
holds someone in its grip, the person flees towards the passions and so distances
himself from God. (JR)
9841. J. Dillon, ‘Asômatos: Nuances of Incorporeality in Philo,’ in C.
Lévy (ed.), Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie, Monothéismes
et Philosophie (Turnhout 1998) 99–110.
With reference to Gig. 8,Plant. 12, and Opif. 73 (where Philo seems to
imply that the stars, as pure intellects, are incorporeal), Fug. 133 (the mind as
νερμν κα πεπυρωμένν πνεμα), Opif. 31 (where Philo seems to make
a gradual difference between the super-celestial, paradigmatic light and the
celestial lights), Conf. 176–177 (angels and heavenly bodies called σώματι),
Leg. 1.82andSomn. 1.36 (two peculiar uses of the term σώματς), Dillon
concludes (p. 109) that ‘for Philo, as part of his heritage of Antiochian Platonism,
the substance of not only the immanent Logos and the individual intellect, which
arenotperceptibletooursenses,butalsotheheavenlybodies,whichare...
accessible to our vision, can be properly ascribed as ‘incorporeal’, by contrast
with the corporeality of sublunary beings, while also being composed of pure
fire or pneuma. This can be seen as a piece of muddle-headedness, and as a
compromise with Stoic materialism, but it can also—more profitably in my
view—be seen as an indication that the boundary between the corporeal and
the incorporeal was not drawn by many ancient thinkers where we might think
it should be drawn.’ (HMK)
9842. K. Dowden, ‘Cupid and Psyche: a Question of the Vision of
Apuleius,’ in M. Zimmerman (ed.), Aspects of the Golden Ass. Vol. II
Cupid and Psyche (Groningen 1998) 1–22, esp. 14–17.
In trying to place Apuleius’ story of Cupid and Psyche in its intellectual
context, the author argues that Apuleius, the Middle Platonist and man with an
interest in the soul and in mystery religions, represents the mainstream on which
Philo (and Valentinus) drew when developing his allegories. A brief discussion
on the theme of sleep in Philo illustrates this point. (DTR)