Philo of Alexandria - Books and Journals

critical studies 2003 267
copies of the law of nature too (p. 99). Philo elevates Moses to a god-like but
human figure. Two features that distinguish Philo’s Mosaic discourse from that
in other works are that the law of Moses becomes subordinate to the figure
of Moses, instead of the other way around, and Philo distinguishes between
Mosaic writings and his own interpretations, even though he attributes these
interpretations to Moses. Exploring continuities between Second Temple and
rabbinic literature, Najman finds, among other things, that it is ‘misleading’ to
identify Philo’s notion of ‘unwritten law’ with what came to be known as rabbinic
oral law, or Torah she-b#al peh (p. 130). Reviews: A. A. Orlov, SPhA 18 (2006)
215–218. (EB)
20389.H.Najman,‘AWrittenCopyoftheLawofNature:anUnthinkable
Paradox?,’ in D. T. Runia, G. E. Sterling and H. Najman (edd.),
Laws Stamped with the Seals of Nature. Law and Nature in Hellenistic Philosophy
and Philo of Alexandria = The Studia Philonica Annual 15, Brown
Judaic Series 337 (Providence RI 2003) 54–63.
As with the early Stoics and Cicero, if the superior law of nature is unwritten
and transcends the written law of any community, then to link it intimately with
the written law revealed by God, as Philo does, can be seen as incoherent and
paradoxical. An exploration of Philo’s thinking does not entirely remove the
paradox, but it does illuminate an inner logic. To begin, the law of nature and the
Law of Moses have the same source and legislator, God. But more to the point
both have a similar structure. Just as the law of nature is exemplified, not by a
code of actions but by the rational disposition of the sage that enables the sage
to act in accordance with the law of nature, so too, the written law of Moses,
when read within the context of an interpretive community, is a reminder and
expression of the lives of the patriarchs and Moses. (KAF)
20390. L.Nasrallah,AnEcstasyofFolly:ProphecyandAuthority
in Early Christianity, Harvard Theological Studies 52 (Cambridge Mass.
2003), esp. 36–46.
The author examines a range of sources to show that discussions about
prophecy and ecstasy are less concerned to understand these experiences in
themselves than to set limits on who can have access to divine knowledge, to
establish the authority of one’s own group, and to define community identity.
Although she focuses mainly on early Christian debates (especially as reflected
in Paul, Tertullian, and Epiphanius), the author also considers Artemidorus,
Plato, and Philo. The discussion of Philo (pp. 36–46) centres on his treatise Her.
Using Dionysian cultic language and a fourfold taxonomy of ecstasy similar to
Plato’s, he highlights the abandonment of body, sense perception and logos to
allow for ‘the rising of the divine mind’ (p. 44) during a state of ‘ecstasy and
inspired possession and madness’ (Her. 264). In Philo’s account, when one leaves
behind the shallow, human realms of knowledge, one can receive the ‘truly rich
inheritance’ of divine knowledge (p. 44). (EB)