Philo of Alexandria - Books and Journals

292 part two
an element which is practically absent. The attention given to the self-revelatory
aspects of God present in the Decalogue is almost inextricably interwoven with
itsbeingnaturallaw.However,thisdoesnotlessentheimportanceofcompliance
with the special laws for which the ten commandments provide the basic and
more general principles. (HMK; based on the author’s summary)
20419. F.Calabi,‘TraPlatoneelabibbia:ontologiaeteologiain
Filone d’Alessandria,’ Oltrecorrente No. 9, October (2004) 47–59.
The article discusses Philo’s thinking, characterized by his grafting Platonist-
Aristotelian thought on the biblical tradition, as a decisive moment in the transformation
of classical ontology into theology. Philo deals with the themes of
causality of the first principle and the Ideas as thoughts of God, hence with the
problems of unity and plurality of the first principle, transcendence and immanence,
and the modes of action, knowability, describability and nameability of
God. Calabi’s hypothesis is that Philo tries to overcome the philosophical difficulties
by introducing a distinction between points of view; she observes a continuous
oscillation in Philo’s work between, on the one hand, the presentation
of the Powers and the Logos as modes of action of God or even as autonomous
entities, and on the other hand, their presentation as human forms of knowledge,
modes of approaching the first principle. Philo realizes a sort of doubling
effect by distinguishing between Ideas within the mind (Logos) of God
and Ideas which thanks to their creation have obtained an existence outside
it. Do we have here two separate levels of being, or rather two different ways
of looking at the same thing? The author opts for the latter vision, with reference
to and discussion of many Philonic passages (e.g. from Opif. andMut.).
(HMK)
20420. F. Calabi, ‘Ruoli e figure di mediazione in Filone di Alessandria,’
Adamantius 10 (2004) 89–99.
The author discusses the question of a demonology in Philo: whether in Philo
there are mediating beings between God and man. Her answer is that rather
than speak of mediators, one may speak of roles of mediation in Philo, performed
by created beings, viz. angels, who are souls (living in the air) charged
with specific functions. The central text is Gig. 6–8. Calabi holds that for Philo,
souls, demons and angels are different names for the same beings, depending
on the different choices made by them. The mediating role of angels is
in answer to a need of mankind for help, consolation, revelation, and punishment.
Calabi also discusses Opif. 72–75, interpretation of the plural ‘let us
make human beings’ in Gen 1:26. Philo here ascribes a specific role in the
work of creation to angels, viz. the creation of the human being’s imperfect
part (open for evil), as distinct from the general role in the work of creation,
ascribed to the Powers, viz. the creation of the (imperfect) world as a whole.
(HMK)