TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ... - Bilkent University

defeat the well-equipped Ottoman armies, even those commanded by grand-viziers. 4
Şahkulu, the leader of the earliest large-scale Qizilbash uprising, for example, as the
qādi of Bursa reported 5 , managed to reach the walls of Bursa, after which there was
nothing but Constantinople. A number of reports written by contemporary local
governors shed light on the socio-political and religious dimensions of these anti-
Ottoman and pro-Safavid social movements. 6 These letters stress the rebels’ evil-beliefs,
banditry, relationship with the Safavid Dynasty and consistently draw the attention of
central government to the fact that their numbers were increasing day by day. 7 It is
clearly seen from these archival reports housed in Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi (TSA) that the
Qizilbash movement during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century substantially
reduced the authority of the Ottoman Government in Anatolia. One may even go further
arguing that it threatened the existence of the Ottoman regime in Anatolia.
4 For the geographical distribution of these Qizilbash upheavals and their connections with the Safavid
Order see Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und scine Rückwirkungen auf die
Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, pp. 95-221; for an inadequate narration of
the Şahkulu revolt according to Ottoman archival reports, see Şinasi Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli
Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 3-4, Đstanbul, 1959; for the revolt of Shah Celal see Jean-Louis
Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III, Notes et documents sur la révolte de Şâh Veli b. Şeyh
Celâl”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VII, 1982, pp. 5-69.
5 On April 21 st 1511, the qādi of Bursa sent a letter to the Head (Ağa) of the Janissary corps reporting the
recent situation of the Şahkulu revolt. He was alerted that they were, after defeating the chief commander
of Prince Korkud, Hasan Ağa, coming to Bursa and devastating everything on their way. He warned the
Ağa insistently that if a military support from Janissaries did not arrive in two days the whole land would
be lost. The qādi persistently emphasized the fact that he, Şahkulu, was a serious and very dangerous
enemy and any laxity would result in a real catastrophe. See Document E 5451 in Topkapı Palace Museum
Archives (From now on TSA).
6 Most of these letters and reports are published by Çağatay Uluçay, Selahattin Tansel and Jean-Louis
Bacqué-Grammont. See Çağatay Uluçay,”Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu”, Tarih Dergisi, VIII,
cilt 11-12, 1954, pp. 53-90, 117-142, 185-200; Selâhattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, Ankara, 1969;
Sultan II. Bâyezid’in Siyasi Hayatı, Istanbul, 1966 ; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, Les
Safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987.
7 For example, the governor of Antalya informed, in his letter dated March 1511, Prince Korkud about the
emergence of the revolt and depicted the leader of the revolt as had pretended to be a God. He reported
from the mouth of one of his adherents that “his followers say: he is the God, he is the Messenger; and the
day of recurrence will appear in front of him. One who does not believe in him would go to the other
world without faith.” See TSA, E 632. Prince Osman also wrote a letter to the central government on April
16 th 1511, in which he described rebels as destroying mescids and zāviyes, setting fire to the copies of
Kur’an and other books whenever they came across them,and deeming their leader as Mahdi, the divine
rescuer. See TSA, E 2829.
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