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TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ... - Bilkent University

TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ... - Bilkent University

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Selim obviously appeared as the symbol of aggressive policy. 1513 In 1507, during<br />

his invasion of the Dulkadir principality, Ismail passed over the Ottoman lands and<br />

enrolled Turkomans who were Ottoman subjects in his army. Although it was an open<br />

violation of Ottoman sovereignty, Bayezid avoided any open conflict with the shah.<br />

Meanwhile, Selim, in his own turn, pursued a rather aggressive policy. As explained<br />

above, he raided Erzincan in 1507. He did not hesitate to criticize Bayezid’s passive<br />

policy especially against Shah Ismail. 1514 As Đnalcık puts it succinctly,<br />

While, by his submissive attitude, Prince Ahmed was favored by the Sultan and<br />

the Grand Vizier, Selim became the symbol of an aggressive policy. Selim,<br />

however, declared that his concern was not to secure the throne but to save the<br />

empire from the havoc in which it had fallen. Openly criticizing his father’s<br />

inactivity, he showed himself as a champion of the warfare against heretics as<br />

well as Christians. Already from Trabzon he had organized raids into the<br />

neighboring Georgia. His ghazā activities, used as political propaganda, won him<br />

the favor of the Janissaries, the timariot Sipāhīs and Akindjis in Rumelia. It was<br />

the military campaigns that gave opportunity to these military classes to get<br />

promotion, more valuable tīmārs or booty. 1515<br />

One would easily realize that this offensive policy made military classes whose<br />

income and wealth was depended on warship become inclined to Selim. On the other<br />

hand, as reported by Celalzāde, viziers and high bureaucrats were favoring Ahmed’s<br />

candidacy. Selimnāme authors unanimously argue that these statesmen were in favor of<br />

Ahmed since Ahmed was relaxed and soft in disposition. They thought that if Ahmed<br />

1513 ULCY says that Selim first realized the vitality of the qizilbash threat and wrote several letters to the<br />

Porte in order to call attention to this rising danger. But he never received a satisfactory answer. Then he<br />

waged campaigns on the Qizilbash with warriors gathered from the provinces of Rum and Karaman. He<br />

became the leader of sunnism against shi’ism. ULCY1, p. 76. ULCY follows, however, the footprints of<br />

Ottoman court historians, not only in this specific case but also throughout his article, and takes a pro-<br />

Selim stand. As explained in the former sections, the Porte was actually quite aware of the qizilbash threat<br />

and took severe preventive measures.<br />

1514 When their pro-Ahmed orientation became apparent Selim pointed his bitter criticism especially<br />

against viziers and high officials at the Porte. His undated letter, possibly written in Kefe during his<br />

rebellious movement, clearly shows how he accused erkān-ı devlet: “Memleket ahvālinin tedārik olunması<br />

hususunda daima iğmaz-ı ayn vāki’ olub memleketin ahvāli bābında sū-i tedbirinizden gayri nesne zāhir<br />

olmaz. Mā-hāsal-ı kelām bu kadar fitne ve fesāda sizing adem-i ikdamınız vāki olmuştur…” See ULCY1,<br />

p. 79.<br />

1515 Đnalcık, “Selim I”<br />

443

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