TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ... - Bilkent University

efore the Ottomans had time to complete their defensive laager. They also counseled
against a frontal attack, thinking that the strong artillery of Ottomans would easily
disperse the Safavid cavalries. Nonetheless, their seemingly reasonable advice was
rejected both by a senior qizilbash commander, Durmuş Han Şamlu, who had the
privilege of being the son of one of the ehl-i ihtisas 1918 and the Shah’s sister, and by the
Shah himself. 1919 Instead, Ismail made his forces wait until the Ottomans had completed
their dispositions, saying that “I am not a caravan thief, whatever is decreed by God, will
occur.” 1920 As a result, two armies clashed on the next day, on August 23, 1514. 1921
On the left wing of the Safavid army, Ustacaluoğlu Muhammed Beg was
defeated by Sinan Pasha, the former being killed in the battlefield. 1922 On the other side,
Ismail first attacked the Janissary troops guarding Selim at the center. Thanks to the
firearms used only by Ottoman soldiers, the effective defense of the Janissaries forced
1918
A special group of Ismail’s companions during his concealment in Gilan.
1919
HR, pp. 178-9; AA, p. 68.
1920
Eskandar Beg Monshi says that “On the Safavid side, Khan Mohammad Ostājlū, who had just arrived
from Dīār Bakr with his seasoned troops, counseled against a frontal attack because of the strength of the
Ottoman artillery. ‘We must,’ he said, ‘give battle to them when they are on the move.’ Dūrmīš Khan,
however, with arrogant pride in his own bravery, did not accept this advice, and the Shah said: ‘I am not a
caravan-thief. Whatever is decreed by God, will occur.’ And Khan Mohammad fell silent.” See AA, p.
68. Also consider, Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 41.
1921
See Selim’s letter (fetih-nāme) to his son Suleyman in HYDR, pp. 50-52. The same letter is also
included in Feridun Bey, Münşeat, pp. 308-309. Also see IDRS, p. 154; CLZ, p. 239. CLZ frequently
stresses that most of the qizilbash begs and soldiers were drunk before and during the battle. See CLZ, pp.
237-8, 243-44. Lütfi Paşa puts forward the same idea. But his reasoning seems to be fabrication. To him,
on realizing the astonishing greatness of the Ottoman army, Ismail thought that no one could dare to fight
with such a gigantic army; thus, the best way of encouraging the qizilbash fighters was to make them
drunk. Then, argues Lütfi Paşa, the Shah ordered his soldiers to drink wine. See Lütfi Paşa, p. 228. Shah
Tahmasb also admits that most of the Safavid amīrs were drunk on the day of the battle. See Şah
Tahmasb-ı Safevî, Tezkire, translated from Persian into Turkish by Hicabi Kırlangıç, Đstanbul, 2001, p. 40.
Also consider Savory, “The Consolidation”, p. 88, reciting from Khwurshāh b. Qubād al-Husaynī, Tārikhi
Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 513, fol. 473a. There is an interesting note in
AA, which says that “according to the Jahān-ārā (most probably the work of Gaffārī), and this is
confirmed by general report, Shah Esma’il, while his troops were taking up their stations for battle, went
off to hunt quail, and returned to the battlefield after the fighting had started.” See AA, p. 69.
1922
CLZ, p. 242; ALI, p. 1100; SLZ2, p. 24. HR says that at the beginning stages of the battle Muhammed
Han routed the right wing of the Ottoman army, which turned back to the center. But upon his death
during artillery fire, the qizilbashes dispersed and retreated towards the center. See HR, p. 181. AA says
that “Khan Mohammad Ostājlū, who was in the forefront of the Safavid army, was struck by a cannonball
and killed, along with a considerable number of the Ostājlū contingent.” See AA, p. 70.
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