TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ... - Bilkent University

miğfer ve cevşen ü siper māni’ ü dāfi’ olmayub, şahsār-ı vucūd-i bī-sūdlarında
berg ü bār komadı kırdı. Kūh-şükūh güruhların tūde-i berg-i gāh gibi tārumār
idüb, hirmen-i hayāt-ı bī-sebātların havā-yı fenāya virdi. 1928
Contemporary European observers affirm that the Ottomans owed their victory
to their firepower. 1929 Caterino Zeno, Venetian ambassador to the court of Uzun Hasan,
writes,
The monarch [Selim], seeing the slaughter, began to retreat, and to turn about,
and was about to fly, when Sinan, coming to the rescue at the time of need,
caused the artillery to be brought up and fired on both the janissaries and the
Persians. The Persian horses hearing the thunder of those infernal machines,
scattered and divided themselves over the plain, not obeying their riders’ bit or
spur any more, from the terror they were in. Sinan, seeing this, made up one
squadron of cavalry from all that which had made been routed by the Persians,
and began to cut them into pieces everywhere, so that, by his activity, Selim,
even when he thought all lost, came off the victory. It is certainly said, that if it
had not been for the artillery, which terrified in the manner related the Persian
horses which had never before heard such a din, all his forces would have been
routed and put to the edge of the sword; and if the Turk had been beaten, the
power of Ismail would have become greater than that of Tamerlane, as by the
fame alone of such a victory he would have made himself absolute lord of the
East. 1930
1928
KPZ9, p. 111. HS and HR also underscore the decisive affect of firearms in this battle. See HS, p. 606;
HR, p. 182.
1929
In the battle of Çaldıran, the Safavid army was completely devoid of firepower. Why was Ismail’s
army not equipped with firearms? According to Savory, it was not because of their lack of acquaintance
with necessary technology but because of their conscious choice. He argues that at the time of Ismail I,
Safavids thought the use of firearms unmanly and cowardly. See Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p.
43; “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, pp. 88-89; “The Sherley Myth”, Iran, Journal of the
British Institute of Persian Studies, V, 1967, 73-81. Also see Rudi Matthee, “Unwalled Cities and Restless
Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran”, in Safavid Persia, The History and Politics of an Islamic
Society, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, 389-416.
1930
Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 61. For a very similar account see Giovan Maria
Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 120. D.
Ayalon also underscores the crucial role of firearms in the decisive victory of the Ottomans in Çaldıran.
He writes, “Had the Ottomans not employed firearms on such a large scale in the battle of Chāldirān and
in the battles which followed it, it is reasonably certain that their victory – even if they had been able to
win – would have been far less decisive. In other words, the Ottomans would have acquired far less
Safawid territory in hat event and a much stronger Safawid army would have been left intact to prepare for
a war of revenge.” See D. Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamlūk Kingdom, London, 1956, pp.
109-10. ANMG also puts stress on the decisive role of firearms and the Janissaries in the battle. See
ANMG, p. 180. For detailed description of the battle see, in addition to the already cited Ottoman sources,
HR, pp. 177-84; HS, pp. 605-606; TNSS, pp. 55-61.
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