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ecourse to the law courts would only be for non-payment, at least for initial offences
that are subsequently adequately resolved. How might this work in Scotland? First
inspection visit could be at no charge; if anything is found to be in breach of GBR,
then a letter would be sent to the farmer or forester or whoever, warning that if not
corrected within a reasonable time (to be determined), an on-the-spot fine may be
imposed. An enforcement procedure would be set out and farmers would be sent
bills for payment, with risk of court action for non-payment. The size of the fine
could be set at the cost to SEPA for the average time for two farm visits? N.B. this
is not currently envisaged in regulatory options for Scotland. Precedents exist in
Scotland, for example in relation to control of litter by local authorities, but not for
work by SEPA. The idea is to have smaller fines in line with the environmental risk
of the individual misdemeanour, yet still have some regulatory option to encourage
best practice.
However, there is a wider issue of funding the inspection and promotion of good
practice in the rural sector, including monitoring associated environmental quality.
SEPA recovers as much of the costs of regulation as possible from the major point
source discharges such as municipal sewage and process effluents from industry.
SEPA is fully stretched servicing these few thousand such discharges; how will
it recover inspection and enforcement action for the hundreds of thousands of
individually minor sources that together can seriously influence water quality? The
collection of subsistence charges from some rural businesses, or on the spot fines
to cover necessary enforcement, will not be sufficient to fund pro-active campaigns
and educational partnership initiatives as part of catchment management planning.
Diffuse pollution is already a major driver for catchment planning projects in Scotland
(SEPA, 2004b).
For agriculture, it is sensible for all the government-funded agencies whose field
officers visit farms to collaborate:
a) to ensure consistent messages are conveyed to farmers, and
b) with its farm visits, SEPA can fulfil its regulatory duties by undertaking an audit
role of the uptake of good practice and risk to the environment.
While delivery of the message to the sector may be primarily by the sector-based
partners in such a scenario, SEPA would have to continue to play an ever more proactive
role in joint training for agricultural advisors if such a light touch for regulatory
action is to be considered and likely to be effective.
CONCLUSIONS
Regulating rural diffuse pollution presents SEPA with many challenges and
opportunities. With the introduction of WFD legislation and CAR there is an opportunity
to take a fresh look at the means by which this is undertaken. One of the greatest
challenges will come in relation to effectively enforcing pollution-sensitive land-use
decision-making. Promotion of best practice will continue to be the standard means
of diffuse pollution control from rural areas. However, the expense of educational
(e.g. catchment based) initiatives is the hidden cost of light touch regulation: the
regulated sectors need to be told about the GBRs for example, as well as about
how to comply with them. At present central government funding to the agency
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