Download als PDF - Raphael Draschtak

“For a moment, it appeared as though the war were turning dramatically in favour of
the Bosnian Government and its forces. However, the supreme astute VRS
commander, General Ratko Mladic, having been surprised by the scale of the
Bosnian Army success withdrew rapidly, enticing his opponents to chase and
become over-extended before unleashing a ferocious counter-attack. This initially
overwhelmed the Bosnian Army and drove it, not only from ground gained in its
offensive, but also from considerable amounts of territory held prior to the action.
Thus, the events confirmed two key charateristics of the war: the Bosnian Armywhich
had not existed when the Serbs had first begun attacks in Bosnia - had
evolved the capacity to mount attacks which could deal the Serbs heavy blows; but,
General Mladic, although strategically overstreched, retained the power to deliver a
devastating counterblow in a place of choosing, or where necessary.” 401 “The events
in Bihac provided a microcosm of the main features of the military balance in the war.
The Bosnian Army had developed from a four corps structure (with one of those
corps well below strength) into an army with seven corps - increasing the number of
active military personnel from around 80,000 to 120,000 in the space of a year. By
the end of the year, each of those corps was attacking the VRS in two places at
once, thus strechting the manpower deficient Bosnian Serb forces (around 50,000
strong).” 402 Vor allem was die Oktoberoffensive betrifft, gibt es diesen Analysen aus
Sicht des Autors nichts hinzuzufügen.
Fikret Abdic hatte somit in Waffenbrüderschaft mit den Serben zu Jahresende 1994
die Kontrolle über seinen traditionellen Machtbereich um Velika Kladusa
zurückgewonnen (die Stadt selbst fiel erst Ende Dezember mit Unterstützung der
kroatischen Serben wieder an seine Einheiten) 403 , die Regierungsverbände hatten
nach mehr als einem Jahr Konflikt mit Abdic einen Rückschlag erlitten. Zur
Geschichte des innermoslemischen Konflikts, der von den bosnischen Serben
naturgemäß nach Kräften gefördert wurde: „Im September 1993 hatte ‘Väterchen’
Abdic wie er von seinen Getreuen genannt wird, die 350.000 Einwohner zählende
Region zur ‘Autonomen Provinz’ ausgerufen und dem bosnischen Präsidenten Alija
Izetbegovic in Sarajevo den Krieg erklärt. Der ist für Abdic ein islamischer
‘Fundamentalist’, Izetbegovic hält den Abtrünnigen für einen serbischen Vasallen.
(...) Serben und Westbosnier pflegen ein inniges Verhältnis. Abdic schloß
401 James Gow, Another year of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: The Southeast European
Yearbook 1994, S. 236
402 Ebenda. S. 236
403 UNHCR-Office of the Special Envoy for former Yugoslavia, Information Notes on former Yugoslavia
No. 1/95, January 1995, ii
106