Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Intellectual Capital

Ulrica Pettersson and James Nyce
inevitable part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human condition (Lucian and Leape 1994). This is also confirmed by Dekker
(2009a) when he argues that <strong>the</strong> first step to a just organization is a normalization <strong>of</strong> incidents. Many
investigations <strong>of</strong> failure are focused on finding who was responsible and we <strong>of</strong>ten want to find ‘who’
did not do <strong>the</strong>ir job and in extension ‘put <strong>the</strong> accident on <strong>the</strong>ir account’ (2009b). One fundamental
point in <strong>the</strong> organizational learning process is to understand <strong>the</strong> distinction between evaluation and
analysis. “Analysis is a process used to thoroughly understand areas <strong>of</strong> activity identified to have
potential for improvement.” (Eaton, Redmayne and Thordsen 2007, p. 4). No form <strong>of</strong> attaching a value
should be included in analysis; an analysis is a way <strong>of</strong> looking at something in different ways and
developing understanding about it (Eason et al 2007). Malhotra (2007) states, staff must be motivated
to share accurate and timely information within <strong>the</strong> organization. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, he stresses that this
can only occur in a culture and organization in which trust is possible. To achieve this, as Senge
(1995) points out, an organization sometimes has to devalue, if not sacrifice, selfishness and selfinterest.
2.1 Aversion to truth
The ability to report mistakes and difficulties calls for an organizational culture that can admit mistakes
and does not punish <strong>the</strong> messenger (Dekker 2009b). In any organization, human errors seem to be
even more difficult to report than technical incidents (Carlemalm 2009). This is because, according to
Ahrenfelt (1995), individuals can be exposed to negative consequences while delivering reports that
superiors do not like. In addition, falsification or <strong>the</strong> embellishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reality can become a tool
that provides upwards mobility. This in fact can be <strong>the</strong> main obstacle to change in an organisation. “If I
don’t do anything, I don’t make any mistakes, and I will not be punished. If I’m not punished, I’m
almost rewarded.” (Ahrenfelt 1995, p.170). In o<strong>the</strong>r words, objective knowledge is seldom <strong>the</strong> platform
upon which an individual’s career and position in an organization advances or rests (Ölçer 2007,
Malhotra 2007). There is a clear sense that any discussion <strong>of</strong> mistakes can damage an individual’s
career. “Knowledge is not just about success stories. If you can encourage employees to record <strong>the</strong>ir
mistakes with no fear <strong>of</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r action, you will be able to build a truly useful knowledge repository.
With it your organization will be less likely to repeat previous mistakes and able to make decisions
quicker” (Lucier 2003, p. 3). In general <strong>the</strong>re is an unwillingness to admit mistakes for fear <strong>of</strong>
consequences. This organizational ‘fact’ <strong>of</strong>ten conflicts with one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> core values <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer corps
– to be honest and truthful to one’s bro<strong>the</strong>rs. It is this conflict that fuels much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resistance <strong>the</strong>
military has to organizational redesign. It also is responsible for reducing many change and innovation
initiatives in <strong>the</strong> military to something more like window dressing than anything else
2.2 Swedish Armed Forces, a learning organisation?
The SwAF presents itself, as many modern military forces do, as a learning organization (SwAF HQ b
2009). However, in reality <strong>the</strong> organisation is far from fulfilling this requirement (Carlemalm 2009,
Pettersson 2009, 2010). Carlemalm (2009) demonstrates that <strong>the</strong>re is a deficiency in <strong>the</strong> SwAF’s
reporting system, in that reports that describe behaviour outside <strong>the</strong> norm seem to be
unrepresentative in number and kind. This is particularly <strong>the</strong> case in flying operations reports where
<strong>the</strong> link between individual actions and mistakes or error seems so clear.
Every <strong>of</strong>ficer’s competence is measured and his/her promotion is dependent, to a large part, on an
annual written evaluation. This evaluation consists <strong>of</strong> two parts, a certificate <strong>of</strong> that year’s service and
a promotion recommendation written by one’s immediate superior in <strong>the</strong> chain <strong>of</strong> command (SwAF
HQ 1997). Considering <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer’s dependence upon this annual evaluation, one can assume that
personal mistakes and blunders are self reported to one’s chief very infrequently. The result is that
problems <strong>of</strong>ficers encounter in <strong>the</strong> organization are seldom analysed and (re)solved, and <strong>the</strong>
possibilities to reduce frictions in <strong>the</strong> organization remain limited. Over time this could have a less
than beneficial effect for <strong>the</strong> organization.
As most armed forces, <strong>the</strong> SwAF have a ‘set <strong>of</strong> rules and regulations’, containing e.g. disciplinary
action. A superior’s report can have a number <strong>of</strong> consequences for a subordinate. Consequences,
can be divided into two main groups, authorized and unauthorized. First, <strong>the</strong> SwAF personnel
management can, when warranted, administer disciplinary actions that range from a warning, a
temporary or permanent change in position, discharge from <strong>the</strong> service and legal action (SwAF HQ
1997, LAS 1982). Secondly, <strong>the</strong>re are fewer formal disciplinary actions, for example salary reduction,
poor annual written records, suspension <strong>of</strong> education and shifts in assignment (SwAF HQ a 2009). In
any case, <strong>the</strong> balance between what an <strong>of</strong>ficer has done and <strong>the</strong> disciplinary actions taken and justice
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