Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Intellectual Capital

Ulrica Pettersson and James Nyce
in <strong>the</strong> present system is muddy at best. According to Dekker (2009a) <strong>the</strong>re must be clarity in ‘who
draws <strong>the</strong> line’, and <strong>the</strong>re has to be a balance between <strong>the</strong> individual and <strong>the</strong> organizational
responsibility. It may be necessary for SwAF to make <strong>the</strong> link between punishment and end or desired
result clearer to all involved. There are two traditional <strong>the</strong>ories as to why reprimands and punishment
are used; absolute and relative. Absolute punishment, e.g. retribution, is given purposely to cause
suffering, while relative punishment intends to prevent unwanted behaviour through intimidation. A
‘just culture’ perspective does not support this criminalization <strong>of</strong> human error. To punish people for
human error will not decrease errors, just <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> errors reported (Reason 1997, Dekker
2009a).
3. Discussion
Today, <strong>the</strong> SwAF, like most armed forces, faces new and additional responsibilities. The majority <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>m involve operations in new and sometimes unfamiliar environments and cultures around <strong>the</strong>
globe (Smith 2007). This necessitates that learning organisations become more effective, which
means that <strong>the</strong> forces have to identify and implement improvements more rapidly than before. Such
change cycles require a more efficient, equitable lessons learned process (Eden 2009, NATO SG
2008). For such a process to work, it must be implemented in an organizational culture where learning
is accepted and supported. This is an organization that does not search for scapegoats and one
where incidents are normalized (Dekker 2009a, Dekker 2009b). There is a need in particular for <strong>the</strong>
military, where costs do not just include capital but also human injuries and lives, to develop “…a
culture where errors and deviation are regarded not as humans’ failures, but as opportunities to
improve <strong>the</strong> system….” (Lucian and Leape 1994, p. 1857).
Because hierarchy, responsibility, and status are equated with rank and competence in <strong>the</strong> military
and because this is not going to ‘disappear’, <strong>the</strong> problem is how to get ‘bad news’ heard and acted
upon. One solution would be to have <strong>the</strong> SwAF’s reporting structures redesigned in <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> a
‘just culture’ where both <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> responsibility and report are reinvented. Perhaps <strong>the</strong> closest
analogy in <strong>the</strong> research literature to SwAF’s traditional practices and belief regarding responsibility is
<strong>the</strong> critical incident technique (Flanegan 1954). Here, as in most military organizations, both
responsibility and after action reporting rest on <strong>the</strong> individual. Even in <strong>the</strong> SwAF operations outside
<strong>the</strong> country this still tends to be <strong>the</strong> case. In <strong>the</strong> present reporting system, SwAF staff that expose
shortcomings only face negative consequences and seldom receive any compensation, reward or
appreciation. This means, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> link that presently exists between action and discipline in
<strong>the</strong> present system, <strong>the</strong> organization does not provide <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> platform that a learning organization
requires. To improve <strong>the</strong> organization’s reporting system, <strong>the</strong> SwAF ought to import norms, values
and behaviour associated with ‘just culture’. This would mean that <strong>the</strong> disciplinary system would have
to be redesigned and all <strong>the</strong> parties involved in <strong>the</strong> reporting system better protected (Carlemalm
2009).
A ‘just culture’ is not something that can be applied from outside, say by consultants, or normatively
by fiat. In fact, <strong>the</strong> management in <strong>the</strong> SwAF must understand that <strong>the</strong> basis for a transformation into
a ‘just culture’ should begin within <strong>the</strong>ir own organization, by understanding its history, traditions and
beliefs. First <strong>the</strong>n, it is possible to influence and make changes in those important pillars in order to
attain a transformation. The SwAF ought to learn and accept that incident must not be a failure; an
incident should be looked upon as a great opportunity to learn. The organization should avoid all sorts
<strong>of</strong> penalties after an incident; <strong>the</strong>re is no scapegoat to hunt down! On <strong>the</strong> contrary, it should in
advance be crystal clear who will act upon an incident- it must not be a superior, part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
organization line. The civilians, soldiers and <strong>of</strong>ficers should know <strong>the</strong>ir rights (and responsibilities). A
debriefing program ought to be implemented in <strong>the</strong> SwAF, to normalize incidents and to support <strong>the</strong>
organization’s members after an incident (Dekker 2009a, 2009b). Implementing an efficient reporting
system in <strong>the</strong> SwAF is not just about realizing a new technical system, it is much more about all
members’ beliefs and ambition to be a part <strong>of</strong> and contribute to <strong>the</strong> organization’s progress and future.
No doubt, lack <strong>of</strong> trust and confidence in <strong>the</strong> own organisation will seal people’s lips. One should bear
in mind, trust is extremely hard to build and tremendously easy to break (Dekker 2007)!
4. Conclusion
If <strong>the</strong> reporting system could be reinvented so as to integrate SwAF’s core values and assumptions
regarding <strong>of</strong>ficers, and with what we now know about ‘just culture’ in complex organizations, this
would help SwAF adapt to today’s fast changing operational environments. It would also enable <strong>the</strong>
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