Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

of water beneath a glacier and any theory of meaning
which would claim that our language is entirely subservient
to the empirical facts of the world and conforms itself to
match the world around us is naïve and certainly not any
strong basis for a response to skepticism.
The view that our empirical propositions do not
simply boil down into simple atomic propositions is the
beginning of an ample response to skepticism. For if one
were to attempt to insert degrees of doubt into the very
propositions that a global version of skepticism (i.e. a view
that, at its strongest, claims, along with Unger e.g., that we
in fact know very little if not nothing) were to attack it
seems that one must doubt a whole system of thought
rather than individual propositions – we are no closer to
building the bridge to cross the skeptical impasse, but the
riff suddenly seems smaller. If much more is built into our
language use than one-to-one referential correspondence,
than positing the “possibility and intelligibility of
skepticism”(L&M, 83) becomes a rather difficult role to play
convincingly. As Wittgenstein notes, “In order to make a
mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with
mankind.” It does not make sense to say that we make
mistakes in all of our beliefs always, because what are
seen as mistakes from outside the error-ridden languagegame
would be tautologies from within that languagegame.
An error occurs only within a language-game, in
mistaking aspects of the language-game. We must be
careful here to admit that for Wittgenstein there is no
absolutely true, objective relation of signification, Quine as
well suggests that there is no framework which is any more
true or objective. We will discover that Wittgenstein’s
response is that the language-game does not rest on
some foundational, privileged view; the following is an
illustration of this point: Nagel and I may stroll past a tree
one afternoon and observe a group of children playing
Tag. These children call the same object we know as “tree”
their “base”. Would Nagel say here that either the children
or we have made a mistake? Would he address the
children in saying “You cannot in actuality know that this
thing is called “base” there’s always the possibility for a
mistake.” The children, though not versed at all in
Wittgenstein, would either say “Well, what should base be
then?” Or, as true Wittgensteinians, remain silent and go
on with their game.
One can see here how the skeptic’s question “but
how do you know etc.?” has been removed as a serious
knowledge-defeater. If one were to ask the children “but
how do you know this tree here is base and not that tree
over there?” They would, like good Wittgensteinians say,
“Our talk gets meaning from the rest of our proceedings”
(OC, #229). A statement’s context provides enough
ground for certainty. Should they be pressed further “But
you haven’t answered my question, how is it that you can
be certain about something as immaterial as a ‘base’?”
They would perhaps respond “Isn’t the question this: ‘What
if you had to change your opinion even on these most
fundamental things?’ And to that the answer seems to [us]
to be: ‘You don’t have to change it. That is just what their
being ‘fundamental’ is.” (OC, #512) This conversation
could go on until the skeptic walks away unsatisfied or until
the children tire of the line of questioning and go on with
their game.
It is clear that the skeptic is asking something from
the children which they do not understand, not out of
ignorance, but because it does not make sense to
introduce skepticism into their game. The skeptic has yet
to understand that there is something arbitrary even
irrational at the foundation of language-games. The
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Grounded Action: Wittgenstein against Skepticism - Edward Guetti
children could reflect that their understanding of the tree as
base was arbitrary at first, but the whole game unfolded
around that tree being base. One child may mistakenly
claim, in a moment of weakness (or slowness), that a
different tree is base, he would be informed by the rest of
his peers that he is mistaken or, if his claim is acceptable,
the game will change as well as the language-game but
there is no judgment that the former understanding of
‘base’ was incorrect – it was merely part of a different
language-game. Note that the formulation of a ‘base’ in a
game of tag corroborates Wittgenstein’s claim that: “I have
arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one
might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by
the whole house.” (OC, #248)
When the skeptic presses us for criteria for certainty
we may initially supply a few justificatory premises and
support these with other premises, however sooner or later
our explanations come to an end. Does this mean that we
have, like so many before us, fallen victim to the problem
of the criteria? No. In our understanding of languagegames
we understand that explanation must as some
point give way to description, “this is how one plays the
game”. We see that the end of an explanation is not an “an
ungrounded position: it is an ungrounded way of acting”.
(OC, #110) The question then becomes should we rest
content with the idea that our language-games are
ungrounded? Wittgenstein suggests that there is no
greater assurance, that at the end of our justifications
there are not propositions which assure us of truth, for they
could be pressed for their justification. In a clarifying use of
metaphor we see that there is no need to see the ground
or the foundation of our belief as true, for “if the true is
what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor is it
false.” (OC, #205). It is not a knowing or truth that provides
a foundation for our beliefs, rather it is our way of living or
the way we play our language-games. This will later be
strengthened by Quine’s emphasis that one foundation is
on the same epistemic level as any other foundation (e.g.
an explanation of the way things are involving the Homeric
gods is equally as justifiable as contemporary physics)
which explains that there is nothing beyond saying “this is
what we do” and letting that statement serve as a
foundation.
Wittgenstein reemphasizes the notion that
explanations must end a few times throughout On
Certainty, but these two statements resound with the
wisdom of a mystic rather than an everyday philosopher of
language, the first directly related to the children’s game of
tag:
‘So one must know that the objects whose names one
teaches a child by ostensive definition exist.’ – Why
must one know they do? Isn’t it enough that experience
doesn’t later show the opposite? For why should the
language-game rest on some kind of knowledge? (OC,
#477)
And, something much more sagely and advisory
that we might console the unsatisfied skeptic with: “The
difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.”
(OC, #166) If language-games could rest on knowledge,
what would that knowledge be? Of the certainty of
language-games perhaps, but this already is based on
how it is we play language-games – that we just take them
to be certain. Once we see that there is no reason to feel
alarmed at the lack of endless justification, and accept the
“groundlessness of our believing” we will no longer see the
reason for skeptical behavior if not just to play a senseless
language game. For even assuming that one could set-up
a skeptical language-game, which I would presume one