Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Wittgenstein and the Language of Religion in Secular Age
Zora Hesová, University of Potsdam and University of Frankurt Oder, Germany
My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all
men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was
to run against the boundaries of language. This running
against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely
hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to
say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the
absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no
science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in
any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the
human mind which I personally cannot help respecting
deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (LW 1965,
12)
1. A religious point of view?
Wittgenstein's utterances on religion and ethics are largely
isolated, non-systematic and difficult to construe. On the
one hand Wittgenstein states the importance of religion
and ethics for his thinking; on the other hand he never
publicly takes any positive position in religious and ethical
matters. Religion and ethics are very often amalgamated
as they partake in the same difficulty concerning the use of
language.
Wittgenstein was not publicly religious yet he
acknowledged at some point a certain religious
perspective to be central to his thinking: “I am not a
religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from
a religious point of view” (Drury 1981, 94). Apart from the
Lecture on Religious Belief, where Wittgenstein discusses
certain religious expressions, most of his notes on religion
are found in his diaries, especially those from the First
World War and in Vermischte Bemerkungen. Those were
private notes and cannot be seen as his statements on
religion. Moreover, the notebooks from 1916 show a telling
attitude to expressing things religious. The notes on God,
the sense of life and a good way to live were enciphered,
whereas only the notes on logic written down on the
opposite page, material for the Tractatus, were
immediately legible. We can argue that religious and
ethical notes were problematical in their expression and
were destined to remain un-uttered in a way (Macho 1984,
43).
For Wittgenstein, ethics and religion have a similar
status as to expression of their contents: “[…] a certain
characteristic misuse of our language runs through all
ethical and religious expressions.” (Wittgenstein 1965, 9)
We will assume that they are part of one complex (talk of
God, meaning of life, the right way of living) as they purport
to express the speaker's attitude to something “higher.”
This corresponds, as Wittgenstein asserts in Lecture on
Ethics, to a use words in an absolute sense that radically
differs from a mere (and meaningful) statement of facts.
The ascription of an absolute value stands out of usual use
of language. Indeed, religious and ethical speech
contradicts the letter, bestowing on language an
extraordinary power. Yet, there is no reason to assume
that certain uses of language are superior to others:
“There are no propositions which, in any absolute sense,
are sublime, important, or trivial” (LW 1965, 5). In this
context Wittgenstein's utters the in many regards startling
statement on the paradoxical use of religious language:
“My whole tendency and, I believe the tendency of all men
120
who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run
against the boundaries of language. This running against
the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless.”
(LW 1965, 12)
Consequently, Wittgenstein's avowed religious point
of view does not in any way lead to expression of religious
contents, quite on the contrary. In an attempt to solve this
apparent contradiction, I will attempt to circumscribe the
place of the “running against the wall of language” in
Wittgenstein's writings.
2. Impossible articulation of religion
The thesis of limits of language certainly belongs to the
first, Tractarian phase of Wittgenstein's reflection on
language. Here, language is essentially a means of
representation and its justifiable use is merely descriptive,
factual. A more complex idea of language helps to
attenuate the most radical edge of Wittgenstein's criticism
of religious language. Yet, it does not solve it.
In the Lectures on Religious Belief Wittgenstein
talks about “the enormous gulf” (LW 1966, 53) between
those who believe and talk about the Last Judgement and
himself, who can at most abstain from expressing an
opinion on that matter. The reason is twofold: Firstly, the
meaning of religious dogmas is unclear, and without
appeal to a non-religious person like him. Likewise, calling
Jesus “my Lord” is not totally un-understandable, yet “it
says nothing” to him, unless may be “he lived totally
differently” (Wittgenstein 1977, 101). Secondly, it seems
utterly meaningless to have an opinion on these matters.
“'Opinion' sounds queer.” (LW, in Pojman 1998, 436).
Taking part in a certain language-game, here in a religious
language-game, seems to entail far more than a simple
discursive exercise: that is, a shared way of life (common
persistent, admonishing pictures, common concerns etc.)
To those who do not share them, religious language is not
totally accessible, religious metaphors produce only
bewilderment and logical difficulties.
The “characteristic misuse of our language” in
ethical and religious expressions has been stated from a
point of view of a representational use of language.
Acknowledging the mentioned gulf between speakers, they
can be also construed as similes, a pertaining to a nonrepresentational
communication. As it seems to express
an attitude to life (Kross 1993, 113) rather than partake in
a discursive practice, religious speech can be meaningful
when referring to its use inside a specific form of life (Kross
1993, 116). According to Wittgenstein, religion should not
be apprehended as a doctrine (Lehre). We do not adopt a
religious way of life as a finite set of principles, but in a
“passionate embracing of a perspective” (LW 1977, 123)
and through a life experience, not through vision or
understanding (LW 1977, 161). Religion thus appears as
the opposite of a representing discourse, rather as an
expression of a complex form of life.