Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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is no more the last one, and is forgotten, rejected, integrated in other versions (see McGuinness 2002). But if we examine the step more thorough, we see how Wittgenstein nearly represents the moment in which Russell will read his papers: if I don’t survive, get my people to send you my manuscripts, and among them you’ll find the last summary made so and so; it will cost you some trouble to understand it etc. All makes think that the main interest of the letzte Zusammenfassung is to be still the last version at the moment in which Russell will have it in his hands. Die letzte Zusammenfassung is such not only because was composed in der letzten Zeit, i.e. little before 22 October 1915, but because it will be the final synthesis, that is the most up-to-date, also when Russell will receive his manuscripts. If Wittgenstein’s letter was that one of a condemned in the imminence of his execution, the two interpretations would be equivalents: the state of manuscripts during the letter writing down would be the same one at the moment of the testamentary bequest reception. But Wittgenstein cannot know if and when he will dead: who knows whether I shall survive the war, he writes; and he expects a long war. Therefore he’s imagining that in case of his sudden death, perhaps after some month, perhaps after some year of further work, among his manuscripts there will still be the Zusammenfassung written in pencil on loose sheets, and it will be indeed classifiable, for Russell, as die letzte. How could he prefigure something of this sort, if the drawing up on loose sheets was a simple sequential rewriting, immediately obsolete and quickly to eliminate? Nevertheless Wittgenstein feels himself truly, in an obscure way, condemned to death; his letter is at all effects a testamentary disposition. Make Russell read die letzte Zusammenfassung is not a simple fantasy, but a precise will, that formally obligates Russell as Wittgenstein himself. Therefore the letter, while engages Russell as publishing executor, equally engages Wittgenstein to make possible what he promised. His punctilios rigor would not tolerate the idea that Russell would not found any letzte Zusammenfassung written in pencil on loose sheets, any future time Wittgenstein would die. A testamentary disposition remains valid until its revoke, or until it is exceeded by ulterior actions: in this case, until when, on 1919, Wittgenstein writes to Russell again and he succeeds to send him the definitive version. Until that moment, or at least until August 1918 dictate, we must presume that, in force of his engagement, between Wittgenstein’s papers remained die letzte Zusammenfassung written in pencil on loose sheets. The hypothesis seems fantasious because a loose sheets support is rather unusual, and above all because, in general, it is difficult to understand how an on-paper drawing up can remain so along the last version, in spite of its radical restructures. On the contrary, if Wittgenstein had had a PC and had written to Russell: "you’ll find in the 'Dokumente' directory the file: letze_Zusammenfassung.doc", we would not doubted that this would have been the last synthesis for every following month, and not only in the moment in which the letter was sent. Analogous, if we admit that the flying sheets support had a structure finalized to favor a continuous upgrading of the propositional device, it becomes obvious that Wittgenstein’s words testify not only the existence of a copy written "on loose sheets", but the persistence of the support and the relative method of representation for the entire period of treatise composition - in symbiotic parallel with Prototractatus note-book. About “die letzte Zusammenfassung” - Luciano Bazzocchi III This allows a more precise hypothesis on the real structure of the text on loose sheets, that cannot be that one assumed by McGuinness. Sure the melted sheets must respect the propositional numeration, but without falling back in the absolute sequence of final Tractatus editing. In order to use the heuristic hypothesis that the Tractatus is an hypertext organized by hierarchical levels, one has to imagine that the melted sheets structure was very liked as that one of electronic virtual pages. The method with which a today computer science engineer plans a Web site can help us to understand the sense of Wittgenstein job. If the engineer was forced to work with paper and pencil, he would predispose an increasing set of single sheets, on everyone of which to develop different sights. In case he decided to represent the connections by means of absolute numerical indices, a good solution would be just the Wittgenstein decimal notation, that specifies pages virtual positioning and links sequences inside every sight. Structural modifications are done simply changing the numerical index of the single object and they correspond to different arrangements of paper sheets, or of objects inside the same sheet. On paper, this is the best way in order to visualize the dependencies net, which becomes more and more articulate and impossible to reconstruct in abstract on the basis of only pointers. The package of loose sheets remains an optimal work support for all the planning phase and does not demand any overall rewriting. On the contrary of whichever sequential drawing up in decimal order, the version on flying sheets is always up-to-date and available for several representations - by hierarchical lines, sequences of equal level, local or general structures. Additions are possible in every part of the configuration, in particular by putting new objects at the bottom of every sheet, or by inserting ulterior detail sheets – witch is exactly the proceeding way that Prototractatus note-book documents (see Geschkowski 2001, pp.64-66). Probably, every new proposition is put by attempt into different places, reconstructed thanks to various sheets dispositions. Once accepted the new object, it is recorded inside the destination sheet and, with the consequent decimal number, on Prototractatus notebook. If Wittgenstein therefore had not clearly insisted on the "last synthesis written on melted sheets", all this would not be that one pale conjecture. But if we put that indication beside the other clues we have, the picture becomes finally clear: a) The choice of a loose sheets support, with all the risks of conservation, ordering etc., is comprehensible only if it’s strongly finalized to a modelling work b) Such version in 1915 is imagined as "die letzte Zusammenfassung" for all the incoming period; that is, it’s always upgradeable and always concluded, ready for editing c) The Prototractatus note-book, at least after page 28 separation line, has evidently a parallel alter-ego from which to obtain the number of every new proposition and on which to reorganize the propositional cascade; otherwise, the continuous numeration modifications remain inexplicable d) The reference to "melted sheets", that some times seems to return and that puzzled critics, is not else than the echo of only one gradually increased package of sheets. Therefore, the manuscript “written in pencil on loose sheets with numbered propositions" that Heinrich 37
Groag remembers to have had in winter 1917-18 is not properly another new version, like von Wright said (Wittgenstein 1971, p.6 fn.2). Neither it’s necessary, for economy of versions, to anticipate the episode to the previous year and to imagine a memory fault only because in a letter datable in spring 1917 Wittgenstein already asked Groag to return his manuscript sheets (McGuinness 1988, p.265). The loose sheets accompanied the entire Tractatus composition e) The 1918 "Korrectur", cited on Prototractatus page 103, that involves a nearly complete propositions renumbering, necessarily happened on another support, used at least until August 1918 final dictate f) After the "Korrectur", the Prototractatus operativity remains unchanged and the job proceeds in the same exact way of the previous pages, also in presence of a new numeration and therefore with necessary reference to a parallel document. This appears so incomprehensible to the Prototractatus editors that they decide that the notebook properly finishes at page 103 and they don’t publish the successive 18 pages, which they consider simple copy of Tractatus parts and not a preparatory work to it. Viceversa, these pages continue to collect new additions, obviously with the definitive numeration that the loose sheets now have. Some proposition continues to be composed and reviewed on the note-book, with all the corrections of a first drawing up g) The melted sheets instrument is perfected during its use and allows the tuning of the decimal indexes, which is testified – but not explained – by the note-book. The enigma of the numeration, origin of infinite arguments, is all in being the product of a long formal elaboration that is carried out in part on Prototractatus (moreover very rarely taken in consideration from critics) and in part elsewhere, quickly growing rich of multiple uses and means. From a point on, the ulterior evolution remains invisible; the "Korrectur" pointed out on page 103 exalts an architectonic and aesthetic function that was able to be fine-tuned only through the formal work on melted sheets. IV The representation on loose sheets is not the only possible one; Wittgenstein, so as our hypothetical computer science engineer, considers it a work support. It isn’t evidently proposable for a sequential edition, because it would lose its main value: the possibility to freely reorganize the pages at different deepening levels. While the engineer can decant the sheets in their electronic analogous, Wittgenstein is forced to decide for one definitive paper sequence. This can only become in tight numbers order, assigning to every proposition its absolute logical place. The iconic-formal composition remains at reader responsibility, who must have the necessary ability to logical abstraction. But if an exhaustive representation turns out nearly impossible for a normal reader, it would remain to ask how could therefore Wittgenstein create a so pregnant architecture, in converging of logical, aesthetic and (for their needing power) ethic requests. The elaboration by loose sheets, to which Wittgenstein points out, answers well to the question, because it allows complex structural alternatives and it was able to represent much sophisticated formal aspects. This hypothesis naturally emerges in experimenting the effectiveness of the hypertextual transcription of the Tractatus, which exalts similitudes, symmetries and shapes that Wittgenstein fine tessellated and assembled in one only harmonic organism. 38 About “die letzte Zusammenfassung” - Luciano Bazzocchi References Geschkowski, Andreas 2001, Die Entstehung von Wittgensteins Prototractatus, Bern McGuinness, Brian 1988, Wittgenstein.: A Life. Young Ludwig, 1889-1921, London McGuinness, Brian 1989, Wittgenstein’s pre-Tractatus manuscripts, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 33, pp. 33-47 McGuinness, Brian 2002, Wittgenstein’s 1916 Abhabdlung, in Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy, R.Haller, K.Puhl eds., Wien Wittgenstein 1971 ( 2 1996), Prototractatus, B.F McGuinness, T.Nyberg and G.H. von Wright eds., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London Wittgenstein 1980, Briefwechsel mit B.Russell, G.E. Moore etc., McGuinness and von Wright eds., Frankfurt a. M.
Page 2 and 3: Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
Page 4 and 5: Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
Page 6 and 7: Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9: Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
Page 10: Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
Page 13 and 14: 12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
Page 15 and 16: A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
Page 17 and 18: «views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
Page 19 and 20: Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
Page 21 and 22: Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
Page 23 and 24: sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
Page 25 and 26: 24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
Page 27 and 28: Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
Page 29 and 30: References 28 Intercultural Dialog
Page 31 and 32: While half a muffin is still a piec
Page 33 and 34: References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
Page 35 and 36: Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
Page 37: About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
Page 41 and 42: Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
Page 43 and 44: Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
Page 45 and 46: 5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
Page 47 and 48: Here something strange happens, how
Page 49 and 50: attribution of beliefs and the inte
Page 51 and 52: Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
Page 53 and 54: Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
Page 55 and 56: 54 An economist’s reflections on
Page 57 and 58: 56 An economist’s reflections on
Page 59 and 60: How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
Page 61 and 62: Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
Page 63 and 64: 62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
Page 65 and 66: 64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
Page 67 and 68: Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
Page 69 and 70: Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
Page 71 and 72: Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
Page 73 and 74: 72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
Page 75 and 76: structures that tend to shade off i
Page 77 and 78: Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
Page 79 and 80: Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
Page 81 and 82: group theory for obtaining the basi
Page 83 and 84: Radical Interpretation and Intercul
Page 85 and 86: References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
Page 87 and 88: 86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
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Persons can also have beliefs about
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Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
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culture in which laws of the intell
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elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Reservations to Human Rights Treati
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legal jargon calls its “objective
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Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
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Do We Really Need Relativism About
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MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
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It follows from this approach that
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Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
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egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
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220 Natural Language and its Speake
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Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
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einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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importance, since it appears no les
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238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
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244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Double Meant is not Double Good: A
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The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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not white, so the fact that “snow
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252 Experience and social norms in
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Can there be such thing as a “hop
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feeling that was both thought or fe
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258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
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Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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interpersonal communication is real
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264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
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References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
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Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
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Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
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274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
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276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
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Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
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282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
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Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
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286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
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If we can learn a social practice,
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Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
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Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
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another culture is also the sign of
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296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
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300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
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Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
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Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
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verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
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310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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feel envy towards his brother witho
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idges chronological distances; for
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Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
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Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
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kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Social Criticism through Internal a
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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
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326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
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Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
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Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
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Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
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Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
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individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
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experience gives an epistemological
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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
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3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
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Outline of Arguments against Natura
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346 Outline of Arguments against Na
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Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
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352 The Significance of Intercultur
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354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
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358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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