Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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References A Perspective of Dialogical Engagement Between Self and Culture - Ranjan K. Panda Buber, Martin 1965 Between Man and Man, New York: Macmillan. Cassirer, Ernst 1944 An Essay on Man: An Introduction to Philosophy of Human Culture, New Haven: Yale University Press. Dallmayr, Fred 1994 “Culture and Global Development”, in: Journal of Contemporary Thought 4, 99-111. Gadamer, Hans-Gerorg 2004 Truth and Method, New York: Continuum. Mohanty, J. N 2000 The Self and Its Other: Philosophical Essays, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nandy, Ashis 1999 Tyranny, Tradition and Utopia, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Pande G. C 1994 “Culture and Cultures”, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XI, 1994. Pradhan R. C 1996 “Life, Culture and Value: Reflections on <strong>Wittgenstein</strong>’s Culture and Value”, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XIII, 19-30. Verne, Donald P. (ed) 1979 Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 1935 –1945, New Haven: Yale University Press. Werkmeister W. H. 1967 Man and His Values, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 245
Double Meant is not Double Good: A Problem for Kane’s Response to the Chance Objection James Petrik, Ohio University, USA One frequently voiced objection to libertarian theories of freedom, which I will call the “Chance Objection,” is that undetermined choices are nothing more than chance events for which it does not make sense to hold an agent morally responsible. This paper considers a particularly clever response to this objection advanced recently by Robert Kane (Kane, 1999). Drawing upon work by J.L. Austin (Austin 1961) and Philippa Foot (Foot 1966) concerning cases in which indeterminism between an agent and her intended outcome does not block the assignment of moral responsibility, Kane employs a doubling up of their strategy in arguing for the possibility of a special class of free actions that are immune to the chance objection. These special actions, which Kane calls “self-forming actions” (or SFAs), result from a situation of choice which has the following features: 1) it is undetermined which of two competing choices an individual will make and 2) it is appropriate to hold the agent morally responsible whichever choice is made in the end. Though impressive in its ingenuity, I argue that Kane’s response succumbs to the following dilemma: If his SFAs are a straightforward doubling up of the Austin/Foot strategy, it leads to an incoherent account of the situation of choice; however, if his argument is understood in a way that avoids this incoherence, it deviates from the Austin/Foot strategy in a respect crucial to the intuitive case they make for the compatibility of moral responsibility and indeterminacy of outcome. 1. Kane’s Solution to the Chance Objection Kane begins his response to the chance objection by conceding to the compatibilist that most free and responsible choices are determined in the sense that they flow from a character and will already formed. Having made this concession, however, he goes on to maintain that such causally determined choices can’t be the whole story behind moral responsibility. If it were, “there would have been nothing we could have ever voluntarily done to make ourselves different than we are,” and this, according to Kane, is a condition “inconsistent with our having the kind of responsibility for being what we are which genuine free will requires.” (Kane 1999, 224) So, free and responsible choices that flow from a character already formed presuppose that we have a kind of control over our characters. Kane locates this control in “self forming actions” (SFAs) a subset of the class of free actions that have the following characteristics: a) they are the product of choices that are causally undetermined and b) they are the origin – at least in part – of the more entrenched character and will that a person comes to develop. SFAs occur when an individual is torn about what to do because she is caught between competing motivations or desires that are recommending mutually exclusive courses of action. Kane gives content to the suggestion that the choices behind SFAs are causally undetermined by supposing that what the agent experiences introspectively as indecision is correlated with indeterminacy at the neurophysiological level in that the competing desires map onto “competing” neural pathways that interfere with one another in such a way that it is undetermined which neural pathway will achieve dominance and thus issue in action. 246 In order to show that the undetermined choices behind his SFA’s are immune to the Chance Objection, Kane first draws upon work by J.L. Austin and Philippa Foot in which they argue that assigning moral responsibility to an agent for the outcome of an action is consistent – in at least some cases – with the outcome being less than fully determined. In such cases, an agent acts on the basis of a settled intention to bring about some result; however, in the execution of the overt action there is some indeterminacy in the agent’s efferent neural pathways which makes it undetermined whether the agent will actually succeed in doing what he set out to do. Here we are asked to imagine an assassin who has a political figure in his crosshairs; however, the assassin suffers from an indeterministic tremor that might lead to the shot being missed. Nonetheless, if the tremor happens to conspire with the assassin’s intention and the shot finds its mark, we are willing to blame the assassin for the murder. We are willing to do so for the simple reason that he did what he was consciously and intentionally trying to do, and his having done so was the result of his effort. Now it is one thing to show that responsibility is consistent with the outcome of an intended action being undetermined, but it is quite another to show that responsibility is consistent with the choice behind an action being itself undetermined. And it is the latter, of course, that a solution to the Chance Objection requires. Whereas Austin and Foot discuss scenarios in which the indeterminacy is at work subsequent to the agent’s choice to perform an action, Kane is interested in cases in which the indeterminacy leads up to the agent’s choice to perform the action. To respond to the Chance Objection, then, Kane must show that a choice’s being causally undetermined can be reconciled with assigning responsibility for the choice. To do this, Kane notes that his SFA’s involve a kind of “doubling-up” of the Austin/Foot strategy. Since the choice behind an SFA constitutes the resolution of the conflict of motives that is the source of the indeterminacy, it is appropriate to say – whichever action is chosen – that the agent did what she was “trying and wanting to do all along.” (Kane 1999, 223) In this sense, Kane’s SFA’s allow for a greater assignment of responsibility than is warranted in the case of the shaky assassin. The shaky assassin receives blame when the intended outcome is achieved; however, he does not receive credit when it fails as a result of indeterminacy in the efferent neural pathways for the simple reason that the failure was not intended. In the case of Kane’s SFA’s, however, there is precisely that symmetry to the assignment of moral responsibility that we believe accompanies a free choice between alternative courses of action. Irrespective of which choice emerges from the struggle at the level of motivation and desire, it is appropriate to conclude that the agent did what she was striving to do throughout. (Kane 1999, 223) Kane highlights this feature of SFAs by noting, “failing is never just failing; it is always also succeeding in doing something else we wanted and were trying to do.” (Kane 1999, 234) Thus it is, says Kane, the choice behind an SFA is not something that “just happens” or “happens by chance”;
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Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
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Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
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Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
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Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
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Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
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12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
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A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
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«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
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Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
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Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
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sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
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24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
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Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
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References 28 Intercultural Dialog
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While half a muffin is still a piec
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References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
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Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
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About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
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Groag remembers to have had in wint
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Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
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Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
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5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
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Here something strange happens, how
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attribution of beliefs and the inte
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Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
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Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
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54 An economist’s reflections on
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56 An economist’s reflections on
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How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
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Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
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62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
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64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
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Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
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Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
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Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
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72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
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structures that tend to shade off i
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Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
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Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
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group theory for obtaining the basi
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Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Page 221 and 222: 220 Natural Language and its Speake
Page 229 and 230: Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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Page 239 and 240: 238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
Page 241 and 242: Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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Page 245: 244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Page 259 and 260: 258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
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Page 265 and 266: 264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Page 269 and 270: References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
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Page 273 and 274: Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
Page 275 and 276: 274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
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Page 289 and 290: If we can learn a social practice,
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296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
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300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
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Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
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Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
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verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
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310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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feel envy towards his brother witho
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idges chronological distances; for
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Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
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Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
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kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Social Criticism through Internal a
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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
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326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
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Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
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Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
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Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
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Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
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individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
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experience gives an epistemological
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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
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3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
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Outline of Arguments against Natura
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346 Outline of Arguments against Na
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Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
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352 The Significance of Intercultur
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354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
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358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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