Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

the possibility of defending the cartoons as works of art.
Surely, their aesthetic quality is minimal. If it were high, it
could outweigh minor moral objections, making them
morally tolerable.
More to the point, of course, is freedom of the press,
partly subsumable under freedom of expression. Yet, it
possesses special features and is associated with special
obligations, articulaed in the many professional codes of
ethics of journalists. I distinguish between the decision to
publish the cartoons in the first place and decisions to
republish them. Jyllands-Posten published the cartoons
after illustrators had refused to contribute to a book on the
Koran and Muhammad or at least wanted to remain
anonymous, for fear of Muslim retaliation, and after this
matter had been reported in the Danish press. Angered by
this, the editors of Jyllands-Posten wanted to show
courage (required by those codes) and test the exercise of
free speech in Denmark. They could not foresee the
reactions abroad. Had they known them, they said, they
would not have published the cartoons. This concession,
surely, is rather prudential than purely moral.
Decisions to republish the cartoons form a mixed
affair. They might be inspired by the same motives as
those of Jyllands-Posten. But they can also be seen as
exercises of the right and duty to inform the public
truthfully, adequately and comprehensively about a
controversy. Muslim circles, of course, have seen them as
insult piled on insult.
4. Morality in a Messy World
Violence, threat or manipulation has no place or role
in morality as such. If someone offended someone else,
then, from the moral point of view, the offended one may
express his anger in a non-violent form, the offender
should offer his sincere excuses, possibly mitigated in the
case of an unintentional offense, will often promise not to
repeat his misconduct and think of some additional ways
of making repair. Yet, in reality, offenses frequently lead to
verbal fights and more. The straightforward moral point of
view gets obstructed by thoughts and acts of aggression,
resentment, revenge, strategic manipulation and also of
self-defense and self-protection, depending on the
circumstances. It is not that ethics has nothing to say
about situations where things get out of hand. For fights of
a greater dimension, for example, there after all are the
well worked-out Principles of Just War. In all such
situations, there is the general moral duty to restore peace
and security. Legal systems and international treaties – in
the example given, the Geneva Conventions – are meant
to bring some order into the messy human world. One,
then, has the second-order moral duty to heed the law and
agreements.
The circumstances that go to explain the reactions
in the cartoon controversy are too many and too complex
to be detailed here (cf. Bednarz et al. 2006). There is the
long history of enmity between Islam and Christianity. The
Muslim world and culture lost the superiority they once
possessed. Many Muslims now feel exploited, excluded,
humiliated, misunderstood or despised by the West. And
since 9/11 Muslims have felt subject to a generalized
suspicion of being potential terrorists. Given such feelings,
it was easy for religious and political leaders to organize
mass protests and boycotts, and let violent reactions to the
Danish cartoons happen – maybe welcome distractions
from their own problems at home. Acts of destruction and
incitements to kill the cartoonists, of course, are morally
unacceptable.
Reflections on Ethics and Cultural Clash - Peter P. Kirschenmann
What about the circumstances in Western
countries? The invited cartoonists who refused to
contribute or wanted to stay anonymous remembered that
all Muslims were called upon to kill Salman Rushdie and
knew about the actual murder of Theo van Gogh. The
“courage” shown by the editors of Jyllands-Posten could
be considered to be misplaced. The substantial issue, also
in most of the commentaries, has been whether, or in how
much, we should sacrifice freedom of speech to Muslim
threats and violent actions. If we did so at all, in a
reconciliatory mood, due to non-ethical motives, we would
at least lose some of our moral integrity and maybe much
more. If we did not, politicians might fear that we would
endanger the flow of oil from Arab countries.
One commentator (Black 2006) says to be furious
about any attempts to placate Muslim demonstrators,
“understand” their anger. Her main argument is that they
should not complain, since they have been doing the same
thing with their anti-Semitic cartoons and their anti-Semitic
and anti-American propaganda. Such a very common tu
quoque argument has little to do with morality: it does not
ask what is right, but denies the opposing party the
relevant moral standing for complaining. It is a
confrontational strategic move, though, to me, an ethically
permissible one. A. Hirsi Ali (2006), who had to go into
hiding because of death threats, has, in her political and
cinematographic work, been emphatically pleading for
abandoning a policy of reconciliation in favor of a policy of
confrontation with respect to radical fundamentalist
Muslims, from whom more moderate Muslims, in her mind,
too little distantiate themselves. She reminds us of
Chamberlain’s policy and its consequences, replaced then
by Churchill’s. In a confrontational approach, morality will
often be moved to the back seat, except for the
assessment of the envisioned goal.
5. Concluding Remarks
Europe had to go through long periods of atrocious and, in
large part, senseless religious wars before the principles of
religious freedom and tolerance were formulated and
accepted. In many countries, revolutions and violent
struggles were needed to establish or enforce civil rights
and liberties, among which free speech; at times, nonviolent
movements have been successful. It is not
predictable which course Islamic countries will take in
these respects. Some, like S. P. Huntington (1996), think
that world politics is entering a phase in which clashes, not
so much between nations, but between cultures, most of
which religion-based, will be inevitable. Even if one does
not share this view, it is certainly not enough just to hope
that conflicts will disappear.
No ethical theory tells us to condone oppression or
terror. Thus, one should strive, as suggested by Oomen, to
realize liveable local arrangements, morally and otherwise
acceptable, as much as possible honoring human rights.
Historical and current experience, though, warns us that
changing a totalitarian religious order too rapidly, may
cause more pain than positive results. One should also
work towards a global order which incorporates at least
minimal moral standards. On both fronts, negotiation and
dialogue will be needed. Yet, these cannot get underway
in a civilized form, as long as the circumstances, as
sketched above, have not suitably changed.
For judging cultures and intercultural transactions,
H. Procee (1991) formulated two ethical meta-principles,
those of non-exclusion and of promotion of interaction.
“The first demands respect and some protection of other
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