Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Substance and Attribute in the Controversy Between the Two Greatest Western Philosophers … - Tomasz Kakol
Theorem 2. Two substances having different attributes
have nothing in common with one another. If by attributes
he understands predicates conceived through themselves,
I agree with it provided that there are two substances, A
and B, and c is an attribute of substance A, d is an
attribute of substance B; or that c and e are the only
attributes of substance A, whereas d and f are the only
attributes of substance B. It would be otherwise if these
substances had some attributes in common, and some
not, e.g. if c and d were A’s attributes, and d and f – B’s
ones. Now, if Spinoza denies this possibility, one must
demonstrate this impossibility. In case of disagreement, he
will probably prove this theorem in this way: since d and c
express the same essence (as we have assumed that
these are the attributes of the same substance, namely A),
and the same goes for d and f (as they are also the
attributes of the same substance, namely B), so c and f
[express the same essence]. From this it follows that A and
B are the same substance, contrary to what we have
assumed. Hence, that two different substances have
something in common is an absurdity. I reply that I haven’t
assumed that there can be two attributes conceived
through themselves, yet expressing the same. For
whenever this fact holds, those two attributes expressing
the same, albeit in different ways, can then be resolved [=
decomposed], and at least one of them. That can be easily
proved by me.
Theorem 3. If two things have nothing in common with one
another, one cannot be the cause of the other (from
axioms 4, 5).
Theorem 4. Two or more different things differ from one
another either in attributes of substance, or in affections.
He proves it as follows: everything which is, is either in
itself or in another (from axiom 1), that means, (from def. 3
and 5), there is nothing outside the intellect but substances
and their affections. Here I am surprised that he forgets
about attributes, for according to def. 5 by affections of the
substance he understands only modes. It follows that
either he expresses it equivocally or he doesn’t regard
attributes as things existing outside the intellect, but only
substances and modes. Anyway, he could demonstrate
this theorem more easily, if he had only added that things,
which could be conceived through their attributes or
affections, necessarily could be known through them, and
hence differentiated.
Theorem 5. In reality there cannot be two or more
substances having the same nature i.e., attribute. Here I
notice that it seems to be unclear what ‘in reality’ would
mean. Would he understand by it ‘in the domain of existing
things’ or ‘in the domain of ideas or possible essences’?
Next, it is unclear whether he wants to say that there are
not many essences having the same attribute or whether
he wants to hold that there are not many individuals having
the same essence. I am also surprised why here he uses
words ‘nature’ and ‘attribute’ as synonyms, unless he
understands by attribute something which includes the
whole nature. But having assumed that I cannot see in
what way there can be many attributes of the same
substance, [attributes] conceived through themselves.
Proof: if substances differed from one another, they would
differ either in affections or in attributes; if in affections,
then, since substance is by its nature prior to their
affections (from theorem 1), setting aside affections, these
substances must differ from one another, hence, differ in
attributes, and if in attributes, then there are no two
substances having the same attribute. I reply that there
seems to be a paralogism here. For two substances can
be distinguished by their attributes, and yet they can have
certain attribute in common, provided that they have (apart
from this attribute) some properties. For example, if there
were two substances, A and B, the former having
attributes c, d, and the latter – d, e. I also notice that
theorem 1 is not used by Spinoza anywhere but in this
proof. True, this proof could be made without this theorem,
since it suffices that substance can be conceived without
affections, whether it would be by its nature prior to their
attributes or not.
Theorem 6. One substance cannot be produced by
another substance, for (from theorem 5) there are no two
substances having the same attribute, hence, they have
nothing in common with one another (from axiom 5). The
same in other words and in a much shorter way, since that,
which is conceived through itself, cannot be conceived
through another, e.g. through a cause (from axiom 4).
Anyway, I reply that I agree with this proof provided that
substance is assumed here as a thing conceived through
itself; things will be different if one assumed substance to
be something which is in itself, as people usually assume,
unless one demonstrates that being in itself and being
conceived through itself are the same.
Theorem 7. Existence pertains to the nature of substance.
Substance cannot be produced by another (theorem 6).
Therefore, it is the cause of itself, that is (from def. 1), its
essence itself involves existence. Here Spinoza is rightly
criticized for the fact that at one time he assumes cause as
something fixed, whose specific meaning is established by
def. 1, and at another time he uses it in its popular
meaning. Yet the remedy is simple, if he had transformed
def. 1 into an axiom and said: everything which doesn’t
come from another comes from itself, i.e., from its
essence. True, other problems arise here: namely, the
reasoning will be valid if we assume that substance can
exist. For it is necessary that substance will exist by itself
(if it cannot be produced by anything else), hence, exists
necessarily. Therefore, one must prove that substance is
possible, i.e., it is conceivable. It seems that it can be
demonstrated from the fact that if nothing is conceived
through itself, then nothing will be conceived through
anything else, hence, nothing at all will be conceived. In
order to show it clearly: one should consider that if one
assumed that a is conceived through b, the concept of b is
in the concept of a itself. And again, if b is conceived
through c, the concept of c is in the concept of b itself, and
thus, the concept of c itself will be in the concept of a itself,
and so on, up to the last concept. If someone said that
there was not the last concept, I would reply that there is
not the first one, which can be demonstrated as follows:
since in the concept of a thing, which is conceived through
another thing, nothing can be found except what is
different, thus – decomposing the concepts gradually –
either nothing can be found in it or nothing but that which
is conceived through itself. And this proof I regard as quite
novel and valid. And with its help one can demonstrate
that what is conceived through itself, is conceivable. Yet
one can still doubt whether this thing is possible in the
sense of “possible” used here, namely, not as something
which is conceivable, but as something whose cause
(which finally amounts to the first cause) is conceivable.
For things we can conceive cannot be produced because
we can conceive them: [if they cannot be produced that is]
in virtue of other things, more perfect ones, with which they
are incompatible. Thus, that being which is conceived
through itself actually exists, must be demonstrated by
experience [, namely:] since there are things which are
conceived through something else, something through
which they are conceived, exists. As you can see, in order
to prove in a strict way the existence of the thing existing
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