Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Against Their Own Intention: Problematic Consequences of Ontological Emergence - Georg Gasser and Joseph Wang emergentism- is not needed anymore. The good news is that the concept of emergentism is still useful as an epistemic help to distinguish substances from “scattered objects”. References: Hasker, William 2001 The emergent self. Ithaca. Cornell Univ. Press. Loewer, Barry 2001 From Physics to Physicalism. In: Gillett, Carl / Loewer, Barry (ed.) Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge Univ. Press. Lowe, Ernest Jonathan 1998 The Possibility of Metaphysics. Substance, Identity, and Time. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press. McLaughlin, Brian 1992 The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In: Beckermann / Flohr / Kim (ed.): Emergence or Reduction?, 49- 93. Moreland J.P. / Rea, Scott B. 2000 Body & Soul. Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Intervarsity Press. Morowitz, Harold 2004 The emergence of everything. How the world became complex. Oxford: Oxford University Press. O'Connor, Timothy / Jacobs, Jonathan. 2003 "Emergent Individuals", Philosophical Quarterly 53, 540–555. O'Connor, Timothy / Wong, Hong Yu 2005 “The Metaphysics of Emergence”. Nous 39 (4), 658-678. Quante, Michael 2002 Personales Leben und menschlicher Tod. Personale Identität als Prinzip der biomedizinischen Ethik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Stephan, Achim 1999 Emergenz. Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation. Dresden: Dresden Univ. Press. Simons, Peter M. 1998 “Farewell to Substance: A Differentiated Leave-Taking”. In: Ratio 11 (3) 235-252. Zimmermann, Dean W. 1995 “Theories of masses and problems of constitution”. In Philosophical Review 104, 53-110. 97
Recognising Beauty : On The Intercultural Dialogue In Philosophy Mahlete-Tsige Getachew, University of York, UK 1. "The Bluest Eye" In her novel, The Bluest Eye, Toni Morrison gives us a story of two young black girls growing up in 1960s white America, and who begin to discover that beauty can only have blue eyes and blonde hair. One of the girls is Claudia MacTeer, the narrator, who tells us: 98 It had begun with Christmas and the gift of dolls. The big, the special, the loving gift was always a big, blueeyed Baby Doll. From the clucking sounds of adults I knew that the doll represented what they thought was my fondest wish ... I had only one desire: to dismember it. To see of what it was made, to discover the dearness, to find the beauty, the desirability that had escaped me, but apparently only me. Adults, older girls, shops, magazines, newspapers, window signs – all the world had agreed that a blue-eyed, yellow-haired, pink-skinned doll was what every girl child treasured. (Morrison 1970: 13-14) Claudia responds to this culture in two ways: she insistently refuses to acknowledge the beauty of white girls, of white people, and she becomes enraged that white and black people refuse to acknowledge her beauty. In contrast to Claudia, there is Pecola Breedlove, a more timid and perennially damaged character. Like Claudia, Pecola is not thought of as a candidate for beauty because of her blackness; unlike Claudia, Pecola concurs with this judgement, and regards herself as ugly and as someone who deserves the rejection and ignominy she encounters. This failure to recognise her own beauty takes its most disturbing form when she makes a visit to the local holy man to ask for a strange and desperate miracle: "I can't go to school no more. And I thought maybe you could help me." "Help you how? Tell me. Don't be frightened." "My eyes." "What about your eyes?" "I want them blue." ... He thought it was at once the most fantastic and the most logical petition he had ever received. Here was an ugly little girl asking for beauty ... Of all the wishes people had brought him – money, love, revenge – this seemed to him the most poignant and the one most deserving of fulfilment. A little black girl who wanted to rise up out of the pit of her blackness and see the world with blue eyes. (Morrison 1970: 138) Claudia and Pecola represent two different strategies of self-definition in response to a marginalisation. Claudia retains her self-belief but thinks this must be accompanied by antagonism and hostility; Pecola surrenders her self-belief and chooses abnegation and self-effacement in order to be accepted and valued. Following Honneth, I argue that this dynamic is an example of the struggle for recognition and for recognition's attendant self-respect, self-esteem, and love (Honneth 1995); this sort of recognition is, as Taylor rightly points out, a vital human need and so withholding it is a form of oppression (Taylor 1991: 43-53). But what I think Toni Morrison shows us, in addition, is that this dynamic results in a loss of beauty; Morrison takes this dynamic out of the sphere of justice – a sphere where we may have become jaded or fatigued or may simply be defensive or complacent – and rediscovers its power to appal by locating it in the aesthetic imagination. I want to do the same for intercultural philosophy, and I read The Bluest Eye as a parable for the situation of intercultural philosophy and the prospects for an intercultural dialogue. Before there can be an intercultural dialogue in philosophy, there must be different philosophical cultures in a relationship of mutual recognition. I argue that many philosophical cultures are experiencing a profound and persistent lack of recognition, and this is causing a steady loss of beauty, a bleeding of loveliness, from philosophy as a whole. It is evident that the dominant culture in philosophy – the Shirley Temple so hated by Claudia and so revered by Pecola – is the academic analytic philosophy that has its origin in Athens 500BC and is most widely practised in universities in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Consequently, different or alternative philosophical cultures to this have been set up in a relation of "the Other". One important group of other philosophies that consistently have recognition withheld from them are the philosophies that originate from different ethnic or historical traditions, philosophies that do not have the peculiar honour of being a footnote to Plato. In this group I count non-Western philosophies such as African philosophy, Arabic philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Jewish philosophy, South Asian philosophy, and South American philosophy, as well as the philosophical practices of communities that were marginalised or otherwise abused in the days during and after the West's empire-building and colonial eras. For evidence of this lack of recognition, I offer the comparative meagreness of scholarship in these areas, easily less than 10% of philosophical output; moreover, of this scholarship, a distressing amount takes the form of papers with titles like "Is there such a thing as Chinese philosophy?" or "Does African philosophy exist?". But philosophy's spectrum of beauty is not merely a collection of ethnically-sourced variations; a culture of philosophy is any school or tradition of philosophy that brings to the activity a distinctive perspective, or set of concepts or concerns, or maybe a different vocabulary or practice to help deal with the objects of philosophy. With this notion of "culture" it is clear that the map of philosophical cultures offering us different sorts of beauty can be drawn in a number of ways, with some cultures overlapping with and supervening on each other; I shall say more about this interrelation of cultures later. For now, I am particularly interested in the status of feminism, and of Continental philosophy. Both feminism and Continental philosophy are distinct philosophical cultures that share part of their history with the dominant analytic culture of philosophy; yet the intercultural dialogue between them and analytic philosophy has been, at best, erratic. Feminism is recognised within political philosophy, but in epistemology and philosophy of language, for example, its contributions rarely form part of the conversation; that is to say, its contributions in many aspects of philosophy are largely
Page 2 and 3:
Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
Page 4 and 5:
Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
Page 6 and 7:
Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9:
Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
Page 10:
Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
Page 13 and 14:
12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
Page 15 and 16:
A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
Page 17 and 18:
«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
Page 19 and 20:
Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
Page 21 and 22:
Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
Page 23 and 24:
sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
Page 25 and 26:
24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
Page 27 and 28:
Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
Page 29 and 30:
References 28 Intercultural Dialog
Page 31 and 32:
While half a muffin is still a piec
Page 33 and 34:
References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
Page 35 and 36:
Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
Page 37 and 38:
About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
Page 39 and 40:
Groag remembers to have had in wint
Page 41 and 42:
Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
Page 43 and 44:
Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
Page 45 and 46:
5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
Page 47 and 48: Here something strange happens, how
Page 49 and 50: attribution of beliefs and the inte
Page 51 and 52: Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
Page 53 and 54: Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
Page 55 and 56: 54 An economist’s reflections on
Page 57 and 58: 56 An economist’s reflections on
Page 59 and 60: How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
Page 61 and 62: Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
Page 63 and 64: 62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
Page 65 and 66: 64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
Page 67 and 68: Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
Page 69 and 70: Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
Page 71 and 72: Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
Page 73 and 74: 72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
Page 75 and 76: structures that tend to shade off i
Page 77 and 78: Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
Page 79 and 80: Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
Page 81 and 82: group theory for obtaining the basi
Page 83 and 84: Radical Interpretation and Intercul
Page 85 and 86: References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
Page 87 and 88: 86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
Page 89 and 90: Is naturalism progressive? A natura
Page 91 and 92: References 90 Is naturalism progres
Page 93 and 94: practice with the philosophers’ (
Page 95 and 96: Against Their Own Intention: Proble
Page 97: 96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
Page 101 and 102: 100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
Page 103 and 104: 102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
Page 105 and 106: Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
Page 107 and 108: 106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
Page 109 and 110: Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
Page 111 and 112: wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
Page 113 and 114: References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
Page 115 and 116: of water beneath a glacier and any
Page 117 and 118: given physical world and our repres
Page 119 and 120: would be a further substratum on wh
Page 121 and 122: Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
Page 123 and 124: The fact that religious attitude is
Page 125 and 126: 3. Potentials and limitations of de
Page 127 and 128: Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
Page 129 and 130: 128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
Page 131 and 132: akademischem Charakter, natürlich
Page 133 and 134: 132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
Page 135 and 136: Substance and Attribute in the Cont
Page 137 and 138: 136 Substance and Attribute in the
Page 143 and 144: understands the patient's worldview
Page 145 and 146: Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
Page 147 and 148: cultures, unless they fail to heed
Page 149 and 150:
identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
Page 151 and 152:
Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
Page 153 and 154:
152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
Page 155 and 156:
154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
Page 157 and 158:
Wittgenstein on consciousness in
Page 159 and 160:
158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
Page 161 and 162:
Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
Page 163 and 164:
Did you do something wrong if you c
Page 165 and 166:
References 164 Did you do something
Page 167 and 168:
zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
Page 169 and 170:
Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
Page 171 and 172:
Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
Page 173 and 174:
our view, this plurality of remarks
Page 175 and 176:
Designation and Ontological Commitm
Page 177 and 178:
176 Designation and Ontological Com
Page 179 and 180:
For one thing, those who appeal to
Page 181 and 182:
On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
Page 183 and 184:
For instance, it takes creative mor
Page 185 and 186:
184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
Page 187 and 188:
Derivativeness, production and reac
Page 189 and 190:
4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
Page 191 and 192:
Our concept of non-compositionality
Page 193 and 194:
„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
Page 195 and 196:
Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
Page 197 and 198:
Persons can also have beliefs about
Page 199 and 200:
Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
Page 201 and 202:
culture in which laws of the intell
Page 203 and 204:
elated in a world-picture. This I d
Page 205 and 206:
Reservations to Human Rights Treati
Page 207 and 208:
legal jargon calls its “objective
Page 209 and 210:
Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
Page 211 and 212:
Do We Really Need Relativism About
Page 213 and 214:
MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
Page 215 and 216:
It follows from this approach that
Page 217 and 218:
Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
Page 219 and 220:
egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
Page 221 and 222:
220 Natural Language and its Speake
Page 223 and 224:
Page 225 and 226:
Page 227 and 228:
Page 229 and 230:
Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
Page 231 and 232:
230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
Page 233 and 234:
einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
Page 235 and 236:
Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
Page 237 and 238:
importance, since it appears no les
Page 239 and 240:
238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
Page 241 and 242:
Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
Page 243 and 244:
unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
Page 245 and 246:
244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
Page 247 and 248:
Double Meant is not Double Good: A
Page 249 and 250:
The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
Page 251 and 252:
not white, so the fact that “snow
Page 253 and 254:
252 Experience and social norms in
Page 255 and 256:
Can there be such thing as a “hop
Page 257 and 258:
feeling that was both thought or fe
Page 259 and 260:
258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
Page 261 and 262:
Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
Page 263 and 264:
interpersonal communication is real
Page 265 and 266:
264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
Page 267 and 268:
Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
Page 269 and 270:
References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
Page 271 and 272:
Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
Page 273 and 274:
Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
Page 275 and 276:
274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
Page 277 and 278:
276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
Page 279 and 280:
Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
Page 281 and 282:
280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
Page 283 and 284:
282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
Page 285 and 286:
Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
Page 287 and 288:
286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
Page 289 and 290:
If we can learn a social practice,
Page 291 and 292:
Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
Page 293 and 294:
Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
Page 295 and 296:
another culture is also the sign of
Page 297 and 298:
296 Against cultural identity: a fa
Page 299 and 300:
Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
Page 301 and 302:
300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
Page 303 and 304:
Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
Page 305 and 306:
Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
Page 307 and 308:
verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
Page 309 and 310:
Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
Page 311 and 312:
310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
Page 313 and 314:
feel envy towards his brother witho
Page 315 and 316:
idges chronological distances; for
Page 317 and 318:
Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
Page 319 and 320:
Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
Page 321 and 322:
kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
Page 323 and 324:
Social Criticism through Internal a
Page 325 and 326:
Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
Page 327 and 328:
326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
Page 329 and 330:
Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
Page 331 and 332:
Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
Page 333 and 334:
Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
Page 335 and 336:
Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
Page 337 and 338:
individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
Page 339 and 340:
experience gives an epistemological
Page 341 and 342:
The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
Page 343 and 344:
3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
Page 345 and 346:
Outline of Arguments against Natura
Page 347 and 348:
346 Outline of Arguments against Na
Page 349 and 350:
Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
Page 351 and 352:
Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
Page 353 and 354:
352 The Significance of Intercultur
Page 355 and 356:
354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
Page 357 and 358:
A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
Page 359 and 360:
358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
Page 361 and 362:
360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
Page 363 and 364:
Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
Page 365 and 366:
364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
Page 367 and 368:
366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
Page 369 and 370:
Respective Justice through Thick an
Page 371 and 372:
Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
Page 373 and 374:
References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
Page 375 and 376:
374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
Page 377 and 378:
Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
Page 379 and 380:
378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
Page 381:
380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
show all

Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?