Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Naturalised approaches to reasoning are also interdisciplinary in another respect. By considering reason in the specific context of actual reasoning beings rather than as an abstract set of rules, naturalism forces together epistemology and philosophy of mind, making it necessary to consider in close connection to each other such things as epistemic methods, rational decisions and other aspects of philosophy of mind. I would argue that the result is the embodied, situated cognitive science that has come of age during the last decade of the previous century and which is being developed by Andy Clark (1996) among others. Clark views our reasoning abilities through the lens, not of forming complete and accurate models of environments, but of having, at the right time, access to information which is adequate to making the decisions that need to be made at that point. This focus on practical commitment is one that will be seen to run through naturalism. At this point it might seem that the tag of scientism is one that truly fits naturalism, since it is various sciences that I have mentioned. To understand that this is a unfair accusation it is necessary to consider the relationship between science and naturalised philosophy. Given the rejection of the a priori, any methods that are favoured can only be given such status on the basis of their observed results. This means that, in so far as naturalism views science favourably, it can do so only to the degree that science succeeds. The same is true for non-scientific methods, be they the common everyday things that people do when crossing the street or choosing fruit at a grocer’s or be the activity under consideration literature and poetry, both of which I would argue have a cognitive, epistemic role. Given that naturalism does not see in science a particular set of universal methods, scientific activity is seen as continuous with other human activities, different only in the degree of institutionalisation, formalisation, selfcriticism and self-awareness regarding the particular context-dependent methods it uses. Of course, the continuum of human methods must be seen in the context of the continuum of the methods that are used by living beings in general. As such, human science, human knowledge and – perhaps most importantly – human reason must, likewise be seen as part of that continuum. 4. Naturalism’s openness to various methods also has a down-side. By accepting the input of other disciplines and epistemic methods naturalist accounts of reason are forced to somehow deal with the fact that these various sources often proscribe differing courses of action. This is as true when comparing clinical medicine with homeopathy, or people’s fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer 2000) with Bayesian rules of inference, as when the comparison is between how a chemist and a paramecium would locate concentrations of dissolved sugars. An uncritical pluralism regarding methods is quite misplaced here. To use Peirce’s (1877) phrase, “real and living doubt” will have real consequences in terms of the sorts of ways one will act and, although in discussion we may eschew commitment, we can not avoid it in action. At the same time an uncritical conventionalism, though quite capable of guiding actions, will not be capable of improving upon the status quo. Invoking Peirce in this context is most appropriate, as a number of prominent naturalists who have grappled with these issues (Haack 1993, Hooker 1991, Hacking Reason, red in tooth and claw: naturalising reason - Konrad Talmont-Kaminski 1983, Hookway 2000, Rescher 2005) have found his pragmatism to be capable of providing the right context for working towards an answer. The vital aspect in this instance is Peirce’s (1878) insistence that “the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action”. Hooker (1991: 63) presents the point this way: [A] shift to an alternative paradigm of acceptance as an act of practical commitment leads to a decision theoretic epistemology where consequences play a key role, acceptance strategies can be subject to selective development, and there is no requirement for foundations. The approach offers the hope that it is possible to get away from a foundationalist model without giving up on the transcendence project since it is now the practical commitment which is to underwrite the necessary normativity (witness for example, the (Collier 2000, Bickhard 2003) biologically inspired project to develop an account of function). Likewise, treating the epistemic methods we use as open to development in much the same way as our beliefs about the world we live in (i.e. thinking that methods are essentially beliefs about how we can go about finding out about our world) provides a way to internalise Kuhn’s and other’s objections to the logicbased account of rationality. Other problems that troubled traditional account of reason remain to be dealt with, Hume’s problem being the foremost among them. In that particular case naturalism is better placed to provide a reasonable answer due to its modesty regarding the efficacy of epistemic methods, i.e. the fact that it recognises that methods are only going to be effective in certain limited contexts. Hume, after all, did not show that our inferences will fail in all possible worlds but only that there will always be some where they will fail. Together with an argument to the effect that it is reasonable to expect that we exist in a predictable world, naturalism is enough not so much as to solve Hume’s problem – since it is strictly unsolvable – but, merely, to learn how to live with it. 5. Thinking back to Brown’s characterisation of logic-based rationality we can consider the features a naturalised rationality will have: 1) Rational solutions need not be universal, instead they will be only effective in appropriate contexts. 2) Rationally acceptable conclusions do not have to follow necessarily from the information given, as acceptance is not to be understood in terms of a formal relationship between propositions but in terms of a practical commitment. 3) The rationality of the conclusions is not necessarily determined by whether they conform to the appropriate rules, indeed the primary focus is removed from conclusions and placed upon actions that are taken on the basis of beliefs and methods that are all subject to further criticism and development. While this characterisation presents a very partial and rough account it does serve to show naturalism’s radical break with previous accounts of reason and to point to the ways in which it seeks to avoid the problems which ultimately brought down the earlier attempt to continue the Enlightenment project. 349
Importantly, where Pascal saw in human reason more than a little of the divine spark, naturalism shows that we may hope to transcend ignorance without recall to anything but our native facility for reasoning. References Bickhard, Mark 2003 “Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation”, in: J. Seibt (ed.) Process Theories: Crossdisciplinary Studies in Dynamic Categories, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. Bishop, Michael & J.D. Trout 2005 Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, New York: Oxford University Press. Callebaut, Werner & Rik Pinxten (eds.) 1987 Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program With a Complete Evolutionary Epistemology Bibliography, (Synthese Library, 190) Dordrecht: Reidel. Campbell, Donald T. 1974 “Evolutionary Epistemology”, in: P. A. Schilpp (ed.) The philosophy of Karl R. Popper, LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 412-463. Carnap, Rudolph 1950 Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago. Clark, Andy (1996) Being There, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Collier, John 2000 “Autonomy and Process Closure as the Basis for Functionality”, in: Jerry L.R. Chandler & Gertrudis van de Vijver (eds.) Closure: Emergent Organizations and their Dynamics, Volume 901of the Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 280-291. De Caro, Mario & David Macarthur (eds.) 2004 Naturalism in Question, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Feyerabend, Paul 1975 Against Method, London: New Left Books. Gigerenzer, Gerd 2000 Adaptive Thinking, New York: Oxford University Press. Goodson, Nelman 1955 Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Haack, Susan 1993 Evidence and Inquiry, Oxford: Blackwell. Hacking, Ian 1983 Representing and Intervening, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hooker, Clifford 1991 “Between formalism and anarchism”, in: G. Munévar (ed.) Beyond Reason Dordrecht: Kluver Academic. Hookway, Christopher 2000 Truth, Rationality and Pragmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, David 1739-40 A Treatise of Human Nature. Jackson, Frank 1997 From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Claredon Press. Keynes, John Maynard 1921 Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan & Co. Kuhn, Thomas 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Milikan, Ruth Garrett 2005 Language: A Biological Model, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pascal, Blaise 1669 Pensées. Peirce, Charles Sanders 1877 “The Fixation of Belief”, Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 1877), 1-15. Peirce, Charles Sanders 1878 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, Popular Science Monthly 12 (January 1878), 286-302. Plotkin, H. C. (ed.) 1982 Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolutionary Epistemology, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Popper, Karl 1935 Logik der Forschung, Vienna: Julius Springer. Quine, Willard Van Orman 1960 Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rescher, Nicholas 2005 Reason and Reality, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 350 Reason, red in tooth and claw: naturalising reason - Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
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Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
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Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
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Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
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Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
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Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
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12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
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A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
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«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
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Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
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Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
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sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
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24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
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Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
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References 28 Intercultural Dialog
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While half a muffin is still a piec
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References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
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Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
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About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
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Groag remembers to have had in wint
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Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
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Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
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5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
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Here something strange happens, how
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attribution of beliefs and the inte
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Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
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Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
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54 An economist’s reflections on
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56 An economist’s reflections on
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How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
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Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
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62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
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64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
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Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
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Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
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Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
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72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
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structures that tend to shade off i
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Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
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Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
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group theory for obtaining the basi
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Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
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Persons can also have beliefs about
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Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
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culture in which laws of the intell
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elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Reservations to Human Rights Treati
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legal jargon calls its “objective
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Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
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Do We Really Need Relativism About
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MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
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It follows from this approach that
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Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
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egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
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220 Natural Language and its Speake
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Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
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einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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importance, since it appears no les
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238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
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244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Double Meant is not Double Good: A
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The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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not white, so the fact that “snow
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252 Experience and social norms in
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Can there be such thing as a “hop
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feeling that was both thought or fe
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258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
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Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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interpersonal communication is real
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264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
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References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
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Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
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Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
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274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
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276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
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Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
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282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
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Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
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286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
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If we can learn a social practice,
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Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
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Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
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another culture is also the sign of
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296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Page 307 and 308: verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
Page 309 and 310: Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
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Page 313 and 314: feel envy towards his brother witho
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Page 349: Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
Page 353 and 354: 352 The Significance of Intercultur
Page 355 and 356: 354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
Page 357 and 358: A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
Page 359 and 360: 358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
Page 361 and 362: 360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
Page 363 and 364: Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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Page 367 and 368: 366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Page 377 and 378: Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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