Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Both notions have been criticised as being speculative, but in neither case this criticism is justified. Yet, there is also a striking difference between Anscombe and von Wright concerning the nature of this more basic dependency concept: for Anscombe the difference between observing and intervening plays no role, but for von Wright it is crucial. I believe that when we turn to Wittgenstein, this difference may be cleared up. 3. Reacting to the cause In his manuscript, Wittgenstein takes issue with a paper by Russell (Russell 1936), who argues that before we come to know a cause by experiencing regularities we must first know it by intuition. Wittgenstein objects to this idea of knowledge by intuition. Instead, he points our attention to the practice of reacting to the cause. In some cases we react instinctively or non-consciously to some external stimulus, e.g., blushing or moving nervously when someone is staring at us. This is a form of reacting to the cause, although there is no mediating ìntuitive awareness'. In this context, Wittgenstein quotes Goethe, `ìm Anfang war die Tat''. The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. (Wittgenstein 1976, p. 420) There are many forms of reacting, not all of which are immediate. In such cases we speak of `looking for the cause'. Here, again, there are different types. In one type of case, we simply trace the cause, e.g., tracing a moving rope to find the person pulling at it. Upon finding this person pulling the rope, reacting to the cause (i.e., to him) is simply a response, e.g., to stop the rope from moving. This reaction need not be construed as the overcoming of doubt or the inference ``that this is the cause of the movement of the rope''. The second type of case is where we do not simply trace the cause, but perform experiments to find the cause. In one case “He is the cause” simply means: he pulled the string. In the other case it means roughly: those are the conditions that I would have to change in order to get rid of this phenomenon. (idem, p. 417) In R. Rhees' lecture notes (p. 433) we find that Wittgenstein claims that it is their common function of predicting what will happen which explains why we use this one word `cause' in both cases. That is not to say that they always give us the same results. We may find by experiment that the cause is something other than the thing to which we instinctively react. But the practice of looking for a cause is one root of the ``cause-effect language-game'' and this explains the use of this word for both types of behavior. Wittgenstein's analysis of causation is more diverse than what is presented by Anscombe and von Wright. Anscombe focusses on the reaction of looking from one thing to another thing: when one billiard ball launches another, our reaction to the cause (the hitting) is that we look at the effect (the movement of the second ball). Though her views are not couched in terms of reactions, they no doubt closely resemble what Wittgenstein writes about tracing the cause. Von Wright accepts the traditional view in which causation is lawlike and nomic, but the reason for this may simply be that he is concerned with the issue of scientific methodology. In natural science we try to discover and Derivativeness, production and reacting to the cause - Rosja Mastop explain regularities by means of experiment. As Wittgenstein's analysis shows, there is no conflict between the existence of this practice and the existence of the practice of tracing causes (this does not exclude the possibility of a conflict between the findings of either practice). Von Wright is only concerned with the latter practice---he explicitly refers to the concept he is interested in as èxperimentalist causation'---and so for him the conceptual connection between causation and regularity is not unreasonable. In this respect, the differences between Anscombe and von Wright in this respect could almost be terminological: for which practice do we reserve the term `cause'? Von Wright directs our attention to the agency involved in performing experiments. He argues that this practice is constitutive of our understanding of causal connections as being nomic. Although this element in von Wright's work is commonly interpreted as an influence of Collingwood, it also clearly follows on Wittgenstein's analysis. Looking for the cause is of course more than a mere shift of attention. We aim to impute the witnessed event to something or someone, or we aim to guard ourselves against something, or, indeed, we aim to intervene in the mechanism to change the course of events. We look for a cause in order to intervene. Consequently, without the idea of being able to intervene we cannot make sense of the practice of looking for the cause. Von Wright then takes the analysis one step further. He notes that tracing an event, qua action, to a person is different from tracing it to, say, a cogwheel or a virus. Looking for the cause is a process that can, in principle, be continued indefinitely. But when we impute responsibility to a person, the tracing comes to an end. This is so, not because the agent is an ùnmoved mover', a view to which von Wright objects, but because holding a person responsible is not the same as tracing the behavior to some cortical activity. The reactions following imputation are different from the reactions upon finding a cause. In the latter case we may either restart the activity of tracing the cause anew, or physically intervene in the mechanism. In the former case, on the other hand, we can ask for the person's motives and reason with him. In doing so, we are not tracing the behavior to some preceding event, but we consider the person capable of intentional action and we are generally satisfied when the motivation strikes us as reasonable or natural. However, giving a motivation presupposes the capability to do otherwise. We do not trace the behavior from the person to his motives, but the motives are attributed to him. In view of this, the attribution of responsibility can give us the idea of alternative futures which the notion of tracing a cause in principle does not. This further step is, I take it, still understandable as Wittgensteinian. In fact, von Wright quotes Wittgenstein in a footnote on this point: An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. (Wittgenstein 1953, sect. 337) This is for von Wright the source for his view that explanation in the social sciences is different from explanation in the natural sciences, and that the latter practice depends on the very same customs and institutions as the former does. 187
4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe and von Wright both express views on the concept of causation that are entirely compatible with Wittgenstein's views. Moreover, from a comparison with Wittgenstein's remarks on this issue it becomes clear the views of his students are at least in essence compatible as well. This observation clearly shows that their views have been misconstrued in the recent literature on the analysis of causation. A new interpretation of those texts that takes its cue from an analysis of Wittgenstein's manuscript is called for. I believe that such an analysis will show that many of the objections that have been ventured against Anscombe and von Wright are based on a misunderstanding of their views. References Anscombe, Elizabeth 1971 Causality and Determination, Cambridge University Press. Collingwood, Roger 1940 An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hausman, Daniel 1997 "Causation, Agency, and Independence," Philosophy of Science 64, S15-S25. Menzies, Peter and Price, Huw 1993 "Causation as a Secondary Quality", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 187-203. Psillos, Stathis 2006 Causal Pluralism, manuscript, presented at EIPE seminar, Rotterdam. Russell, Bertrand 1936 "The Limits of Empiricism", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 36, 131-150. Schaffer, Jonathan 2003 "The Metaphysics of Causation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Sosa, Ernest and Tooley, Michael (eds.) 1993 Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. von Wright, Georg Henrik 1971 Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. von Wright, Georg Henrik 1974 Causality and Determinism, Columbia University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds), G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1976 "Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness", R. Rhees (ed.), Peter Winch (trans.), Philosophia 6, 391 - 408. 188 Derivativeness, production and reacting to the cause - Rosja Mastop
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Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
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Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
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Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
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Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
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Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
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12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
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A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
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«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
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Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
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Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
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sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
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24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
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Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
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References 28 Intercultural Dialog
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While half a muffin is still a piec
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References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
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Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
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About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
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Groag remembers to have had in wint
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Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
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Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
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5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
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Here something strange happens, how
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attribution of beliefs and the inte
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Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
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Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
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54 An economist’s reflections on
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56 An economist’s reflections on
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How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
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Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
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62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
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64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
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Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
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Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
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Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
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72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
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structures that tend to shade off i
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Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
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Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
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group theory for obtaining the basi
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Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
Page 137 and 138: 136 Substance and Attribute in the
Page 143 and 144: understands the patient's worldview
Page 145 and 146: Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
Page 147 and 148: cultures, unless they fail to heed
Page 149 and 150: identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
Page 151 and 152: Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
Page 153 and 154: 152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
Page 155 and 156: 154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
Page 157 and 158: Wittgenstein on consciousness in
Page 159 and 160: 158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
Page 161 and 162: Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
Page 163 and 164: Did you do something wrong if you c
Page 165 and 166: References 164 Did you do something
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Page 173 and 174: our view, this plurality of remarks
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Page 177 and 178: 176 Designation and Ontological Com
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Page 187: Derivativeness, production and reac
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Page 195 and 196: Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
Page 197 and 198: Persons can also have beliefs about
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Page 201 and 202: culture in which laws of the intell
Page 203 and 204: elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Page 209 and 210: Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
Page 211 and 212: Do We Really Need Relativism About
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Page 221 and 222: 220 Natural Language and its Speake
Page 229 and 230: Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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Page 235 and 236: Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
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244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Double Meant is not Double Good: A
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The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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not white, so the fact that “snow
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252 Experience and social norms in
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Can there be such thing as a “hop
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feeling that was both thought or fe
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258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
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Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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interpersonal communication is real
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264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
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References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
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Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
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Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
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274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
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276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
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Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
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282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
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Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
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286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
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If we can learn a social practice,
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Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
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Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
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another culture is also the sign of
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296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
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300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
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Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
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Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
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verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
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310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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feel envy towards his brother witho
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idges chronological distances; for
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Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
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Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
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kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Social Criticism through Internal a
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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
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326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
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Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
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Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
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Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
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Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
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individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
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experience gives an epistemological
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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
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3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
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Outline of Arguments against Natura
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346 Outline of Arguments against Na
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Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
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352 The Significance of Intercultur
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354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
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358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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